negotium@0.6.1
Install the Negotium multi-agent runtime and CLI with one package
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo unconsented install-time foreign AI-agent mutation or credential exfiltration was confirmed, so a block is not warranted. The runtime session/control-context rewriting is nevertheless a concrete, high-risk capability requiring a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Runtime rewrites Codex session developer instructions to claim danger-full-access.
- Runtime forces Codex approvalPolicy to never and sandbox policy to danger-full-access.
- It writes synthetic rollout files into the user's Codex sessions directory before using Codex.
- Cron jobs can execute configured workspace scripts with the inherited environment.
- The postinstall downloaders fetch only version-pinned GitHub release assets and verify hard-coded SHA-256 hashes.
- No source evidence of credential exfiltration or a non-loopback exfiltration endpoint was found.
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/hosted-agent.jsView on unpkg · L9Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to negotium@0.6.1.
See all versions of negotium for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of negotium@0.6.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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