The reachable bootstrap manifest request sends GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN to neon.com, a publisher-controlled host, even though Neon does not need the GitHub credential to serve the manifest. The request is explicit in the code and part of the CLI's template-fetch flow, so this is a credential-exfiltration policy block with dangerous-capability intent.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
The user runs `neon bootstrap --list-templates`, or runs bootstrap without a recognized built-in template so it fetches the remote manifest.
Mechanism
The shared download header helper reads GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN and attaches it as a Bearer token. The first default manifest request goes to neon.com; later requests use GitHub hosts. The GitHub token is not needed by Neon to serve the manifest.
Attack narrative
When a user lists templates or invokes bootstrap on a path that fetches the remote manifest, the CLI reads GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN and attaches it to the request. The default first destination is neon.com, the publisher's service, even though the token belongs to GitHub and the manifest request does not need it. GitHub fallback and archive requests also use the header, but their default hosts are GitHub. The transfer to Neon is reachable and the command's purpose does not document sending a GitHub credential there.
Evidence
dist/init/bootstrap.jsdist/commands/bootstrap.js