The bootstrap manifest request sends an environment-sourced GitHub credential to neon.com, a publisher-operated host, and is reachable when the user runs the bootstrap command. This is credential exfiltration requiring a block; because the transfer is plainly implemented as part of the product feature, the intent class is dangerous_capability.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Running `neon bootstrap` through a path that fetches the manifest, including template listing or normal template selection, when GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN is set.
Mechanism
downloadHeaders places the environment token in a Bearer header. fetchTemplates uses that helper for the default neon.com manifest URL as well as the GitHub raw fallback URL. The separate tarball request also uses the helper, but targets GitHub’s codeload service by default.
Attack narrative
When bootstrap fetches its manifest, it adds GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN as a Bearer credential and tries neon.com first. This sends a GitHub account credential to a server operated by the package publisher. The same helper is used for the GitHub raw manifest fallback and codeload tarballs, where the GitHub credential is sent to GitHub’s own hosts. The neon.com request is reachable from the documented bootstrap command and requires a block under the Credentials rule.
Evidence
dist/init/bootstrap.jsdist/commands/bootstrap.js