node-net-pool@1.0.0

package.json declares a postinstall hook (`node index.js`) that runs automatically on `npm install`. The shipped index.js contains no networking or connection-pool code — the entire file body is a ~6.3KB numeric byte array (`_s`) decoded by a custom LCG+XOR routine (`_d(a,k)` using state `p*0x41C64E6D+0x3039 & 0xFFFF` XORed byte-wise) and passed directly to `new Function(_d(_s,179))()`, dynamically evaluating the decoded payload on the installer's machine at install time. The manifest advertises the package as 'Node.js network connection pool utilities' with `main: index.js`, but index.js exports nothing and only runs the obfuscated executor — the stated purpose does not match the shipped contents. Install-time evaluation of an opaque, obfuscated payload with no legitimate build-step justification, combined with the cover-story metadata, is a supply-chain dropper/RCE pattern. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d24314418bdbb12ec2e84d2058ad3d10a0d281eb3fac01daf3a3e30335b51bae) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.