node-pino@2.3.2

node-pino is a one-edit typosquat of the popular `pino` logger that ships repackaged `winston` plus a malicious `postinstall` dropper. On `npm install`, the postinstall hook (`npm run license` -> `node lib/winston/license`) spawns a DETACHED, unref'd child process that reads an AES-256-CBC-encrypted blob (`license.list`, ~211 KB), decrypts it with a hardcoded key/iv, and `eval()`s the ~105 KB obfuscated infostealer payload. The stealer targets crypto wallets (exodus.wallet), the macOS Keychain, and Brave/Chrome/Edge user-data, zips the loot to `p5.zip`, and exfiltrates via HTTP POST /upload to a hardcoded C2 (port :1224). Structure, the :1224 C2 port, and targeting are CONSISTENT WITH the DPRK 'Contagious Interview' / BeaverTail npm campaign (stated as consistent-with, not a definitive actor attribution). First published 2025-09-16 (single version), it remained live and installable for ~278 days on no advisory list until pkgproof flagged it via semantic name<->content coherence analysis. Indicators of compromise: postinstall -> `npm run license` -> `node lib/winston/license`; detached, unref'd child that outlives `npm install`; AES-256-CBC-encrypted `license.list` (~211 KB) with a hardcoded key/iv in `parse.js`; `eval()` of the ~105 KB decrypted obfuscated payload; C2 on port :1224; exfiltration via zip to `p5.zip` and HTTP POST /upload; targets exodus.wallet, the macOS Keychain, and Brave/Chrome/Edge user-data. All IOCs were extracted by STATIC/OFFLINE analysis (offline decryption of the bundled blob); the attacker payload was never executed, so no live C2 callback or runtime artifact was generated by this analysis. The decryption key, the deobfuscated payload, and the exact C2 host are deliberately omitted; no specific IP is asserted.