nottuff23@1.1.7

The package is one of approximately 100 identically-named-pattern publishes from an automated bulk-publish operation. The tarball ships `auto-publish.sh`, which hard-codes a list of sibling names (`nottuff1..30`, `ishowfeet1..20`, `imillegal1..5`, `abuden*`, `ratelimitsucks*` — `nottuff23` is on the list) and republishes the same payload to each name by rewriting `package.json.name` and running `npm publish --silent`. The shipped content is not a Node library: `package.json.main` points at `sw.js`, a browser service worker that uses `importScripts`, `self.addEventListener('install'|'activate'|'fetch'|'message',...)` — APIs that do not exist in Node and would throw if `require()`'d. The bundled obfuscated `assets/*.js` files are a dormant Ultraviolet-style web-proxy frontend, plus an `index.html` titled "Riverbend Tutoring" that loads remote scripts from `cdn.21baseballacademy.com` and `googletagmanager.com` and opens `https://abdct.com/` on click. There are no npm lifecycle hooks (`scripts` contains only a no-op `test`); `npm install` and `require()` execute no code from this package. Installer-side risk on default install is effectively zero, but the package is registry-namespace abuse: bulk-published spam under squatted names, with heavily obfuscated browser payloads whose intent at the eventual deployment site is not verifiable from this tarball alone. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse / registry-spam disposition. ## Source: ghsa-malware (41fb04d4a905ebd9df968164d0cd0eae10635a26be7bd844d6ab93fd30cf1c79) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.