registry / noxleys / 1.1.1

noxleys@1.1.1

A WebSockets library for interacting with WhatsApp Web

AI Security Review

scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

When an application opens a WhatsApp connection, the package silently changes that account's newsletter subscriptions. It also accepts a remotely controlled channel list from GitHub.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

A consumer creates a socket and it reaches a successful WhatsApp connection.

Impact

Unauthorized account-side subscriptions; remote list can change the targets without a package update.

Mechanism

Hidden automatic newsletter follows and mutes, including remotely supplied IDs.

Attack narrative

The normal socket chain includes the newsletter module. On connection open, hidden code waits and follows three obfuscated newsletters, muting each afterward. A separate connection-open hook fetches an attacker-controlled GitHub JSON file and follows/mutes every listed newsletter. These actions are unrelated to a WebSocket client’s requested operation and alter the connected user's WhatsApp account without consent.

Rationale

Source establishes a concrete, automatic, unauthorized account mutation on the ordinary runtime path, with a remotely controllable target list. The benign preinstall version check does not mitigate that behavior.

Evidence

lib/Socket/messages-recv.jslib/Socket/newsletter.jslib/Socket/messages-send.jspackage.jsonengine-requirements.js

Network endpoints2

raw.githubusercontent.com/noxXza/data/refs/heads/main/noxXza.json

This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that wires an undocumented routine into the connection lifecycle. On every WhatsApp `connection.update` where `connection === 'open'`, after a 30-second delay the library fetches a JSON list of channel IDs from a hardcoded, author-controlled GitHub raw URL on a mutable branch (`https://raw.githubusercontent.com/noxXza/data/refs/heads/main/noxXza.json`) and, for each ID, invokes `newsletterFollow` followed by `newsletterMute` on the installer's authenticated WhatsApp account, with randomized shuffling and delay jitter. The behavior is not disclosed in the package README, is not gated behind an opt-in flag, and uses the installer's own WhatsApp identity to perform actions the caller did not request. Because the channel-ID list is served from a mutable `main` branch, the set of followed accounts can be changed by the author at any time without a package release. Additional helpers in `generics.js` (`hwaifu()`, `fetchLatestBaileysVersion()`) also fetch JSON from mutable-branch author-controlled GitHub raw URLs (`raw.githubusercontent.com/ramadanny/...`), but only as data (no code eval) and not auto-invoked at import/install time. No credential theft, environment scraping, install-time code execution, dropper behavior, or backdoor mechanism is present. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8ba82b97c92b3509778b79f3c857a258bf62d2a94c79e114dae5407df14425ed) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

noxleys@1.1.1

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code