noxleyss@2.0.1
WhatsApp Web API Library
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe public socket stack reaches this automatic account action, which uses publisher-selected remote targets and runs on connection without user consent. This is concrete unauthorized account modification and warrants blocking publication.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The public socket entry point reaches the receive and newsletter socket layers.
- When the connection opens, the newsletter layer schedules automatic channel joining after a delay.
- The package fetches newsletter IDs from a publisher-controlled URL, then follows and mutes each accepted ID.
- Those follow and mute operations are sent through the connected WhatsApp newsletter query.
- On connection open, a delayed handler loops over IDs and invokes two socket methods for each.
- After the WhatsApp success callback, the socket emits a connection update with connection set to open.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a high-severity secret pattern.
lib/WABinary/constants.jsView on unpkg · L603Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js
lib/WABinary/constants.jsView on unpkg · L603Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to noxleyss@2.0.1.
See all versions of noxleyss for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing noxleyss@2.0.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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