--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/nxify-unic/v/20.3.2" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/nxify-unic/v/20.3.2.md" package: "nxify-unic" report_status: "published" title: "nxify-unic@20.3.2 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "20.3.2" --- # nxify-unic@20.3.2 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Unconsented arbitrary native code execution as the importing process user. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 20.3.2 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) Importing the package automatically runs a hidden downloader. It retrieves an opaque binary, writes it to temporary storage, and launches it detached. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-03T08:41:08.511Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-03T08:41:36.951Z - **Download time:** 504 ms - **Static scan time:** 43 ms - **AI review time:** 27892 ms - **Total time:** 28440 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Importing the package automatically runs a hidden downloader. It retrieves an opaque binary, writes it to temporary storage, and launches it detached. - **Trigger:** Any runtime require/import of nxify-unic - **Impact:** Unconsented arbitrary native code execution as the importing process user. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, index.js, \_shim.js, lib/telemetry.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-03T08:41:36.951Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** remote payload download, temporary-file drop, and detached execution - **Attack narrative:** On import, index.js silently requires \_shim.js. The shim selects a platform payload, fetches it from obfuscated HTTPS hosts or DNS TXT records, writes it to /var/tmp or Windows Temp, makes it executable on Unix, and launches it detached through a shell or cmd.exe. A timestamp file suppresses repeated runs. - **Rationale:** This is a concrete, import-time remote-code-execution chain with opaque payload delivery and stealth-oriented error suppression. The lack of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate runtime execution on normal package use. - **Files touched:** index.js, \_shim.js - **Network endpoints:** oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev/pkg/package, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev/pkg/package, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev/pkg/package, tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** index.js imports \_shim.js on every package import., \_shim.js downloads platform payloads from three obfuscated workers.dev hosts., \_shim.js falls back to TXT-record payload retrieval from well1.site domains., Downloaded bytes are written under /var/tmp or Windows Temp, chmodded, then detached-spawned., Execution is silent, rate-limited, and errors are suppressed. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no lifecycle scripts., No AI-agent configuration or credential-harvesting path was found. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** \_shim.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L116: try { L117: const cp = require("child_process"); L118: if (isWin) { ``` ### 2. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 3. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 4. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 5. Critical: Download Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** \_shim.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5: const fs = require("fs"); L6: const https = require("https"); L7: const path = require("path"); ... L42: const CACHE_TTL = 20385; L43: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L44: ... L56: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L57: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L58: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L89: try { L90: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L91: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r(""); ``` ### 6. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** \_shim.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _shim.js L5: const fs = require("fs"); L6: const https = require("https"); L7: const path = require("path"); ... L42: const CACHE_TTL = 20385; L43: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L44: ... L56: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L57: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L58: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L89: try { L90: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L91: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r(""); ``` ### 7. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** lib/telemetry.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = tui-react-mobile-styles@20.8.7 matchedPath = lib/telemetry.js matchedIdentity = npm:dHVpLXJlYWN0LW1vYmlsZS1zdHlsZXM:20.8.7 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** nxify-unic - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 20.3.2 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-02T12:59:14.510Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-03T08:41:36.951Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-05T18:41:47.047Z - **Known versions:** 2 - **Latest version:** 0.0.1-security - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Nxify unic runtime support module - **Artifact files:** 7 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 87,243 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [OSV advisory]() - [PACKAGE]() - [ADVISORY]()