--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/oh-my-claude-sisyphus/v/5.3.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/oh-my-claude-sisyphus/v/5.3.0.md" package: "oh-my-claude-sisyphus" report_status: "published" title: "oh-my-claude-sisyphus@5.3.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "5.3.0" --- # oh-my-claude-sisyphus@5.3.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 5.3.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package has a real user-invoked agent-extension setup capability that changes global Claude Code settings and hooks. It lacks an automatic registry-install trigger or confirmed malicious exfiltration chain. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-13T10:49:45.615Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-13T10:51:27.292Z - **Download time:** 1040 ms - **Static scan time:** 25309 ms - **AI review time:** 75326 ms - **Total time:** 101677 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Running the explicit OMC setup command modifies the user's Claude Code configuration, including hooks and status-line settings. Explicit callback configuration can send session summaries to user-supplied notification endpoints. - **Trigger:** User runs omc setup or config-stop-callback. - **Impact:** Persists OMC hooks and settings in the user's Claude configuration; configured callbacks can disclose session summaries to the chosen service. - **Evidence paths:** bridge/cli.cjs, dist/installer/index.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-13T10:51:27.292Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** User-invoked Claude Code extension setup and configured session notifications. - **Rationale:** The package has a real user-invoked agent-extension setup capability that changes global Claude Code settings and hooks. It lacks an automatic registry-install trigger or confirmed malicious exfiltration chain. - **Files touched:** ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.claude/agents, ~/.claude/hooks, ~/.claude/.omc-config.json - **Network endpoints:** api.telegram.org, discord.com, slack.com ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The explicit setup command invokes an installer that writes Claude settings and hook configuration., The CLI can explicitly configure session-end callbacks to Telegram, Discord, Slack, or a supplied webhook., The flagged Jira shell file is a readable regression test with a local stub, not a hidden payload. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; its only publish lifecycle hook is prepublishOnly., No runtime dependency on this package name was found., No automatic credential harvesting or exfiltration path was found during package installation or import. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to oh-my-claude-sisyphus@5.3.0. - Review the evidence and your use of oh-my-claude-sisyphus@5.3.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/autoresearch/runtime.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'child_process'; L2: import { existsSync } from 'fs'; ``` ### 4. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/autoresearch/runtime.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L371: encoding: 'utf-8', L372: shell: true, L373: maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024, ``` ### 5. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% - **Path:** bridge/mcp-server.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2955: sourceCode = this.opts.code.process(sourceCode, sch); L2956: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); L2957: const validate = makeValidate(this, this.scope.get()); ``` ### 6. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/tools/ast-tools.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L18: // L19: // IMPORTANT: Uses createRequire() (CJS resolution) instead of dynamic import() (ESM resolution) L20: // because ESM resolution does NOT respect NODE_PATH or Module._initPaths(). ``` ### 7. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/openclaw/dedupe.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L54: try { L55: const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(statePath, "utf-8")); L56: return { ``` ### 8. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 9. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 10. High: Entrypoint Build Divergence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest entrypoint contains risky behavior absent from dist/build output. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest entrypoint (manifest.bin) carries capability families absent from dist/build output: environment+network, sensitive-file+network, execution+network L43: * Constructs the CommanderError class L44: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L45: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L969: var EventEmitter = require("node:events").EventEmitter; L970: var childProcess = require("node:child_process"); L971: var path27 = require("node:path"); ... L1018: this._outputConfiguration = { L1019: writeOut: (str) => process3.stdout.write(str), L1020: writeErr: (str) => process3.stderr.write(str), ... L1054: * @returns {Command[]} L1055: * @private L1056: */ ``` ### 11. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 12. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** scripts/release-boundary.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text L544: : ""; L545: const propertyIndent = packageJsonText.match(/(?:\r?\n)([ \t]+)"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)+"s*:/)?.[1] ?? `${closeIndent} `;\n const hasProperties = Object.keys(parsed).length > 0;\n const ... L546: cliMain().catch(error => { ``` ### 13. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L43: * Constructs the CommanderError class L44: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L45: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L969: var EventEmitter = require("node:events").EventEmitter; L970: var childProcess = require("node:child_process"); L971: var path27 = require("node:path"); ... L1018: this._outputConfiguration = { L1019: writeOut: (str) => process3.stdout.write(str), L1020: writeErr: (str) => process3.stderr.write(str), ... L1054: * @returns {Command[]} L1055: * @private L1056: */ ``` ### 14. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. bridge/cli.cjs: const configured = process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR?.trim(); return stripTrailingSep((0, import_path.normalize)((0, import_path.join)(home, ".claude"))); function validateAnthropicBaseUrl(urlString) { if (/^((us|eu|ap|global)\.anthropic\.|anthropic\.claude)/i.test(modelId)) { if (process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK === "1") { if (/^((us|eu|ap|global)\.anthropic\.|anthropic\.claude)/i.test(modelId)) { if (process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_USE_VERTEX === "1") { if (process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK === "1") { ``` ### 15. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L43: * Constructs the CommanderError class L44: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L45: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L969: var EventEmitter = require("node:events").EventEmitter; L970: var childProcess = require("node:child_process"); L971: var path27 = require("node:path"); ... L1018: this._outputConfiguration = { L1019: writeOut: (str) => process3.stdout.write(str), L1020: writeErr: (str) => process3.stderr.write(str), ... L1054: * @returns {Command[]} L1055: * @private L1056: */ ``` ### 16. High: Hidden Inline Dependency Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source silently spawns a Node process to execute an inline dependency payload. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L43: * Constructs the CommanderError class L44: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L45: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L969: var EventEmitter = require("node:events").EventEmitter; L970: var childProcess = require("node:child_process"); L971: var path27 = require("node:path"); ... L1018: this._outputConfiguration = { L1019: writeOut: (str) => process3.stdout.write(str), L1020: writeErr: (str) => process3.stderr.write(str), ... L1054: * @returns {Command[]} L1055: * @private L1056: */ ``` ### 17. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/tools/lsp/servers.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6: */ L7: import { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; L8: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'fs'; ... L20: const workspaceRoot = dirname(packageNodeModules); L21: const executable = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'tsc.cmd' : 'tsc'; L22: return join(workspaceRoot, 'node_modules', '.bin', executable); ... L26: while (true) { L27: const packageJsonPath = join(dir, 'node_modules', 'typescript', 'package.json'); L28: if (existsSync(packageJsonPath)) { ... L39: try { L40: const packageJson = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(packageRoot, 'package.json'), 'utf8')); L41: if (typeof packageJson.version !== 'string') { ``` ### 18. High: Cloud Metadata Access - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** bridge/runtime-cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L34: function tmuxEnv() { L35: const { TMUX: _, PSMUX_SESSION: __, ...env } = process.env; L36: return env; ... L41: function isUnixLikeOnWindows() { L42: return process.platform === "win32" && !!(process.env.MSYSTEM || process.env.MINGW_PREFIX); L43: } ... L54: if (process.platform === "win32" && /\.(cmd|bat)$/i.test(resolvedBinary)) { L55: const comspec = process.env.COMSPEC || "cmd.exe"; L56: const commandLine = [quoteForCmd(resolvedBinary), ...args.map(quoteForCmd)].join(" "); ... L111: if (result.status !== 0) return "tmux"; L112: const candidates = result.stdout?.split(/\r?\n/).map((line) => line.trim()).filter(Boolean) ?? []; L113: const first = candidates[0]; ``` ### 19. High: Copied Package Dependency Bridge - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 83.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript package = oh-my-claude-sisyphus; repositoryIdentity = oh-my-claudecode; dependency = @ast-grep/napi L96748: try { L96749: sgModule = await import("@ast-grep/napi"); L96750: } catch (error2) { ``` ### 20. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** bridge/runtime-cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: bridge/runtime-cli.cjs spawns bridge/cli.cjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L34: function tmuxEnv() { L35: const { TMUX: _, PSMUX_SESSION: __, ...env } = process.env; L36: return env; ... L41: function isUnixLikeOnWindows() { L42: return process.platform === "win32" && !!(process.env.MSYSTEM || process.env.MINGW_PREFIX); L43: } ... L54: if (process.platform === "win32" && /\.(cmd|bat)$/i.test(resolvedBinary)) { L55: const comspec = process.env.COMSPEC || "cmd.exe"; L56: const commandLine = [quoteForCmd(resolvedBinary), ...args.map(quoteForCmd)].join(" "); ... L111: if (result.status !== 0) return "tmux"; L112: const candidates = result.stdout?.split(/\r?\n/).map((line) => line.trim()).filter(Boolean) ?? []; L113: const first ``` ### 21. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bridge/cli.cjs L43: * Constructs the CommanderError class L44: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L45: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L969: var EventEmitter = require("node:events").EventEmitter; L970: var childProcess = require("node:child_process"); L971: var path27 = require("node:path"); ... L1018: this._outputConfiguration = { L1019: writeOut: (str) => process3.stdout.write(str), L1020: writeErr: (str) => process3.stderr.write(str), ... L1054: * @returns {Command[]} L1055: * @private L1056: */ ``` ### 22. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bridge/cli.cjs L43: * Constructs the CommanderError class L44: * @param {number} exitCode suggested exit code which could be used with process.exit L45: * @param {string} code an id string representing the error ... L969: var EventEmitter = require("node:events").EventEmitter; L970: var childProcess = require("node:child_process"); L971: var path27 = require("node:path"); ... L1018: this._outputConfiguration = { L1019: writeOut: (str) => process3.stdout.write(str), L1020: writeErr: (str) => process3.stderr.write(str), ... L1054: * @returns {Command[]} L1055: * @private L1056: */ ``` ### 23. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/features/auto-update.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L41: if (process.platform === 'win32') { L42: execSync(`npm install -g ${packageSpec}`, npmExecOptions(verbose)); L43: return; ``` ### 24. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 25. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 26. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** bridge/run-mcp-server.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = bridge/run-mcp-server.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 445 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 27. High: Payload In Excluded Dir - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** skills/project-session-manager/tests/test-jira-provider.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = skills/project-session-manager/tests/test-jira-provider.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 6381 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 28. Medium: Oversized Source File - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = bridge/cli.cjs kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 4834073 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 29. Medium: Oversized Cli Entrypoint - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains an oversized executable-looking CLI entrypoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = bridge/cli.cjs kind = oversized_cli_entrypoint sizeBytes = 4834073 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 30. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 31. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** bridge/cli.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 15 ``` ### 32. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/installer/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = oh-my-claude-sisyphus@5.4.0 matchedIdentity = npm:b2gtbXktY2xhdWRlLXNpc3lwaHVz:5.4.0 similarity = 0.725 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 12 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 14 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 12 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk ^0.1.0 (Dependency) - @ast-grep/napi ^0.31.0 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.26.0 (Dependency) - @types/better-sqlite3 ^7.6.13 (Dependency) - ajv ^8.17.1 (Dependency) - better-sqlite3 ^12.10.0 (Dependency) - chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency) - commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency) - jsonc-parser ^3.3.1 (Dependency) - safe-regex ^2.1.1 (Dependency) - vscode-languageserver-protocol ^3.17.5 (Dependency) - zod ^3.23.8 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** oh-my-claude-sisyphus - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 5.3.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-06T02:24:07.542Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-03T13:38:09.977Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-02T04:02:35.494Z - **Known versions:** 44 - **Latest version:** 5.7.30 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Multi-agent orchestration system for Claude Code - Inspired by oh-my-opencode - **Author:** Yeachan Heo - **Maintainers:** bellman\_04 - **Keywords:** claude, claude-code, ai, agent, multi-agent, orchestration, omc, claudecode, anthropic, llm - **Runtime engines:** node: 20.x || 22.x || 23.x || 24.x || 25.x || 26.x - **Artifact files:** 5310 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 42,104,690 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()