oh-my-claude-sisyphus@5.4.0
Multi-agent orchestration system for Claude Code - Inspired by oh-my-opencode
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not malicious install-hook abuse because npm installation does not invoke the installer. It remains a warning because explicit commands can alter an AI-agent control surface and use configured credentials for network update checks.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI exposes an explicit install command that targets the Claude Code configuration directory.
- The installer reads and modifies its settings file, which can change Claude Code hooks and configuration.
- The update feature optionally sends a user-provided GitHub token to GitHub release endpoints.
- package.json has no npm preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook; its only publish lifecycle entry is prepublishOnly.
- The install path is activated by explicit CLI commands, not package installation or import.
- The reported dynamic Function call is bundled AJV schema-validator code, not remote-response execution.
- The flagged shell file is a Jira-provider regression test that stubs a local jira command.
Source & flagged code
25 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/autoresearch/runtime.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to oh-my-claude-sisyphus@5.4.0.
See all versions of oh-my-claude-sisyphus for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of oh-my-claude-sisyphus@5.4.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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