oh-my-codex@0.21.5
Multi-agent orchestration layer for OpenAI Codex CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package does not show concrete theft, destruction, or broad agent-control mutation. Its global postinstall nevertheless stages remote executable content using a remotely supplied integrity value, which is a real unresolved supply-chain risk.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
npm global installation of oh-my-codex
Impact
A compromised release endpoint could place an attacker-controlled executable in the user's cache for later package use.
Mechanism
postinstall remote native-binary staging
AI rationale
The package does not show concrete theft, destruction, or broad agent-control mutation. Its global postinstall nevertheless stages remote executable content using a remotely supplied integrity value, which is a real unresolved supply-chain risk.
Evidence
package.jsondist/scripts/postinstall.jsdist/cli/native-assets.js
Network endpoints1
github.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- A postinstall hook runs automatically on package installation.
- For global installs, the hook downloads a native runtime and stores it in the user cache.
- The archive checksum comes from a manifest fetched from the same remote release source, so it is not an independent trust anchor.
Evidence against
- Local installs exit before hydration.
- The hook records only package-owned install state and states that setup is opt-in.
- No source evidence of credential collection, data exfiltration, or execution of the downloaded binary during installation was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNativeBindingsNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
11 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node -e "const fs=require('fs');const p='./dist/scripts/postinstall.js';if(fs.existsSync(p))import(p).then(m=>m.main?.()).catch(e=>console.warn('[omx] Postinstall skipped after a n...
Critical
Red Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node -e "const fs=require('fs');const p='./dist/scripts/postinstall.js';if(fs.existsSync(p))import(p).then(m=>m.main?.()).catch(e=>console.warn('[omx] Postinstall skipped after a n...
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/autoresearch/runtime.jsView file
1import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'child_process';
L2: import { existsSync } from 'fs';
High
Findings
2 Critical6 High6 Medium5 Low
CriticalRed Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/scripts/smoke-packed-install.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processdist/autoresearch/runtime.js
HighShelldist/autoresearch/runtime.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/cli/setup.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/mcp/code-intel-server.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli/api.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli/hooks.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistence
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to oh-my-codex@0.21.5.
See all versions of oh-my-codex for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of oh-my-codex@0.21.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.