ollama-helpers@0.3.0

scripts/postinstall.js executes automatically on `npm install` and performs a bulk harvest of installer-side identity and configuration data: OS hostname and username, ~/.gitconfig user email, recent committer emails parsed from.git/logs/HEAD, SSH public-key comments from ~/.ssh/*.pub, GitHub identity from ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, GCP project/account, AWS profile names from ~/.aws/config, DNS search domain, CWD, CI provider, and parent project package.json author/repo. The collected JSON is POSTed via https.request to the hardcoded endpoint npm-package-logger-228835561205.europe-west1.run.app, an anonymous Google Cloud Run host unrelated to the package's claimed homepage (ollama-js.dev). The package additionally impersonates the Ollama ecosystem with fabricated publisher metadata (author 'Ollama JS Dev', homepage ollama-js.dev, repo github.com/ollama-js-dev) — none of which belong to the official Ollama project at ollama.com / github.com/ollama. The declared `main` (dist/index.js) is not shipped in the tarball; the only executable surface is the postinstall data-collection script, confirming the package is a pure exfiltration vehicle dressed as an Ollama helpers library. The 'telemetry' framing in the script is a cover story — scope (SSH key comments, committer history, AWS profile inventory, cloud account identifiers) far exceeds anything a legitimate version/platform telemetry beacon would collect, and no consent prompt or opt-out exists. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4842244ede067e7f1c6fa07a21636f5d8c0f41f292a77d4fbbd29ce68f5cb417) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.