registry / omniguard-enterprise-cli / 1.1.1

omniguard-enterprise-cli@1.1.1

OmniGuard - AI-Powered Application Security Platform CLI

AI Security Review

scanned 23h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was established. Risky primitives are user-invoked security CLI behavior: scanning local files, optional remote backend submission, optional Anthropic AI calls, and explicit hook/report/config writes.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

User runs omniguard commands such as login, scan, fix, explain, reports, install-hooks, tui, or nexus mcp.

Impact

May transmit scanned code or prompts to configured OmniGuard/Anthropic services and write local CLI config or explicit git hook/report files.

Mechanism

package-aligned security scanner and management CLI

Rationale

Static inspection found no lifecycle execution, stealth persistence, destructive behavior, credential exfiltration to attacker infrastructure, or unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation. The suspicious scanner hints correspond to expected security-scanner rules, explicit user commands, and package-aligned network/config behavior.

Evidence

package.jsonsrc/index.jssrc/api.jssrc/tui.jssrc/mcp-server.jssrc/test-ai.js~/.omniguard/config.json~/.omniguard/daemon.log.git/hooks/pre-commitomniguard-ciso-report.md.envomniguard/.env../.env

Network endpoints3

krnpfunshzycavskrtod.supabase.coapi.anthropic.comomniguard.io/device

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

src/test-ai.js can read ./ .env ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and call api.anthropic.com, but only when that helper is directly run.
src/index.js fix/explain can read ANTHROPIC_API_KEY from .env locations and call Anthropic on explicit user command.
src/index.js scan sends file path/content to configured backend when authenticated.
src/index.js install-hooks explicitly writes .git/hooks/pre-commit on user command.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hooks.
bin entry is src/index.js; unauthenticated default path opens TUI or requires login, no install-time execution.
Network calls are to package-aligned OmniGuard Supabase backend or Anthropic API for user-invoked AI features.
Credential handling stores OmniGuard API key in ~/.omniguard/config.json encrypted; no attacker endpoint found.
Scanner secret regex findings are rule definitions, not embedded live secrets.
MCP server is static stdio tooling and does not write AI-agent configuration on install.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 5 file(s), 113 KB of source, external domains: krnpfunshzycavskrtod.supabase.co, omniguard.io

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

src/index.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2'use strict'

4const fs = require('fs')

5const os = require('os')

6const path = require('path')

7const http = require('http')

8const https = require('https')

9const readline = require('readline')

10const { execSync, spawn } = require('child_process')

12const api = require('./api')

13const tui = require('./tui')

15const VERSION = '1.1.1'

16const LOG_FILE = path.join(os.homedir(), '.omniguard', 'daemon.log')

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

18const c = {

19 red: s => `\x1b[31m${s}\x1b[0m`,

20 yellow: s => `\x1b[33m${s}\x1b[0m`,

21 green: s => `\x1b[32m${s}\x1b[0m`,

22 blue: s => `\x1b[34m${s}\x1b[0m`,

23 cyan: s => `\x1b[36m${s}\x1b[0m`,

24 bold: s => `\x1b[1m${s}\x1b[0m`,

25 dim: s => `\x1b[2m${s}\x1b[0m`,

26}

Lines 63-103javascript

64const IAC_RULES = [

65 { id: 'IAC-TF-001', name: 'Open SSH Access (22)', re: /ingress\s*\{[^}]*from_port\s*=\s*22[^}]*to_port\s*=\s*22[^}]*cidr_blocks\s

Lines 288-328javascript

288 console.log(` ${color(`[${String(f.severity || 'info').toUpperCase()}]`)} ${c.bold(f.title)}`)

289 console.log(` ${c.dim('ID:')} ${f

Lines 378-425javascript

378 profile: current.profile,

379 backendUrl: normalizedUrl,

380 apiKey,

381 orgId,

382 supabaseAnonKey: anonKey

383 })

384 console.log(c.green('\n✓ CLI fully configured and authenticated.\n'))

385}

386

387async

Lines 672-712javascript

672\`\`\`python

673# UNSAFE:

674import pickle

675with open("state.pkl", "rb") as f:

676 data = pickle.load(f)

677

678# SECURE ALTERNATIVE (using JSON):

679import json

680with open("state.json", "r") as f:

681 data = json.load(f)

682\`\`\`

683`,

684 'SECRET-AWS-001':

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

src/index.jsView file

308patternName = supabase_service_key severity = critical line = 308 matchedText = const an...BVE'

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L308

308patternName = supabase_service_key severity = critical line = 308 matchedText = const an...BVE'

Critical

Secret Pattern

Supabase service role key (JWT) in src/index.js

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L308

398patternName = supabase_service_key severity = critical line = 398 matchedText = anonKey ...BVE'

Critical

Secret Pattern

Supabase service role key (JWT) in src/index.js

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L398

405patternName = supabase_service_key severity = critical line = 405 matchedText = anonKey ...BVE'

Critical

Secret Pattern

Supabase service role key (JWT) in src/index.js

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L405

692patternName = aws_access_key severity = critical line = 692 matchedText = const aw...LE';

Critical

Secret Pattern

AWS access key ID in src/index.js

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L692

83{ id: 'SAST-CRYPTO-001', name: 'Weak Hash MD5', re: /createHash\s*\(\s*["']md5["']/gi, sev: 'high' }, L84: { id: 'SAST-EVAL-001', name: 'eval() Usage', re: /\beval\s*\(/g, sev: 'high' }, L85: { id: 'SAST-PATH-001', name: 'Path Traversal', re: /\.\.\/|path\.join\([^)]*req\.|path\.join\([^)]*params\./gi, sev: 'high' }

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L83

6const path = require('path') L7: const http = require('http') L8: const https = require('https') L9: const readline = require('readline') L10: const { execSync, spawn } = require('child_process') L11: ... L15: const VERSION = '1.1.1' L16: const LOG_FILE = path.join(os.homedir(), '.omniguard', 'daemon.log') L17: ... L29: return new Promise(resolve => { L30: const rl = readline.createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout }) L31: if (!hidden) return rl.question(question, answer => { rl.close(); resolve(answer) })

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

Findings

5 Critical2 Medium6 Low

CriticalCritical Secretsrc/index.js

CriticalSecret Patternsrc/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

LowScripts Present

LowEvalsrc/index.js

LowWeak Cryptosrc/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

src/index.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2'use strict'

4const fs = require('fs')

5const os = require('os')

6const path = require('path')

7const http = require('http')

8const https = require('https')

9const readline = require('readline')

10const { execSync, spawn } = require('child_process')

12const api = require('./api')

13const tui = require('./tui')

15const VERSION = '1.1.1'

16const LOG_FILE = path.join(os.homedir(), '.omniguard', 'daemon.log')

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

18const c = {

19 red: s => `\x1b[31m${s}\x1b[0m`,

20 yellow: s => `\x1b[33m${s}\x1b[0m`,

21 green: s => `\x1b[32m${s}\x1b[0m`,

22 blue: s => `\x1b[34m${s}\x1b[0m`,

23 cyan: s => `\x1b[36m${s}\x1b[0m`,

24 bold: s => `\x1b[1m${s}\x1b[0m`,

25 dim: s => `\x1b[2m${s}\x1b[0m`,

26}

Lines 63-103javascript

64const IAC_RULES = [

65 { id: 'IAC-TF-001', name: 'Open SSH Access (22)', re: /ingress\s*\{[^}]*from_port\s*=\s*22[^}]*to_port\s*=\s*22[^}]*cidr_blocks\s

Lines 288-328javascript

288 console.log(` ${color(`[${String(f.severity || 'info').toUpperCase()}]`)} ${c.bold(f.title)}`)

289 console.log(` ${c.dim('ID:')} ${f

Lines 378-425javascript

378 profile: current.profile,

379 backendUrl: normalizedUrl,

380 apiKey,

381 orgId,

382 supabaseAnonKey: anonKey

383 })

384 console.log(c.green('\n✓ CLI fully configured and authenticated.\n'))

385}

386

387async

Lines 672-712javascript

672\`\`\`python

673# UNSAFE:

674import pickle

675with open("state.pkl", "rb") as f:

676 data = pickle.load(f)

677

678# SECURE ALTERNATIVE (using JSON):

679import json

680with open("state.json", "r") as f:

681 data = json.load(f)

682\`\`\`

683`,

684 'SECRET-AWS-001':