---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/open-tag-staging/v/0.1.7-staging.23.1"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/open-tag-staging/v/0.1.7-staging.23.1.md"
package: "open-tag-staging"
report_status: "published"
title: "open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.1.7-staging.23.1"
---

# open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 17 findings warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Telemetry warning (can be blocked)
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Telemetry
- **Selected version:** 0.1.7-staging.23.1
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The CLI automatically sends selected runtime error diagnostics and identifying metadata to its OpenTag server, with no opt-in or disable control evident in the inspected paths. The destination and redaction fit diagnostic reporting, but the undisclosed collection makes this suspicious telemetry rather than malicious exfiltration.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-13T08:59:26.822Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-13T09:01:23.482Z
- **Download time:** 1528 ms
- **Static scan time:** 17084 ms
- **AI review time:** 98048 ms
- **Total time:** 116660 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Automatic runtime error reporting creates a privacy risk; no credential theft or unrelated collector was identified.

- **Trigger:** A CLI command encounters an internal, dependency, or protocol error, or the process has an uncaught exception or unhandled rejection.

- **Impact:** OpenTag's configured server receives diagnostic details and identifying IDs without an evident opt-in or disable setting in the inspected paths.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/cli/index.mjs, dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-13T09:01:23.482Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The CLI resolves its OpenTag server URL and associated identity from local records, then posts a bounded, redacted error report with command and machine/account identifiers.

- **Rationale:** The CLI automatically sends selected runtime error diagnostics and identifying metadata to its OpenTag server, with no opt-in or disable control evident in the inspected paths. The destination and redaction fit diagnostic reporting, but the undisclosed collection makes this suspicious telemetry rather than malicious exfiltration.

- **Files touched:** dist/cli/index.mjs, dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs

- **Network endpoints:** OpenTag server URL resolved from local OpenTag records: \`/api/v1/error-reports\`

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 88.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Unknown

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The CLI installs process-level error reporting and observes command failures during normal command execution., Eligible errors are posted to \`/api/v1/error-reports\` on the server URL resolved from the local OpenTag home., Reports include redacted error messages and stacks, plus metadata fields such as command, computer ID, installation ID, and platform., Command error reporting is limited to internal, dependency, and protocol error categories.

- **Evidence against:** The manifest declares no install lifecycle scripts; reporting is runtime behavior., Reports go to the OpenTag server configured or identified by the user's local OpenTag records, not a hard-coded unrelated collector., The report builder redacts and bounds error messages and stacks.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1.

- Review the evidence and your use of open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli/pi-extensions/background-work.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/cli/pi-extensions/background-work.mjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L3: import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L5: //#region src/pi-extensions/background-work.ts
```

### 3. High: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs>)

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L110: try {
L111: new Function("");
L112: return true;
```

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L34413: const CONTEXT_TREE_COMMAND_CLIENT_SOURCE = `
L34414: import http from 'node:http';
L34415: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L34416: import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
...
L34418: const managed = args[0] === 'sync' || args[0] === 'write';
L34419: const manifest = process.env.OPENTAG_CONTEXT_TREE_MANIFEST;
L34420: let environment = process.env;
```

### 8. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: import { access, chmod, copyFile, cp, link, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, opendir, readFile, readdir, readlink, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, symlink, unlink, writeFile } from ...
L11: import childProcess, { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12: import http, { createServer } from "node:http";
L13: import https, { Agent, request } from "node:https";
...
L21: import { pipeline } from "node:stream/promises";
L22: import { createGunzip, gunzipSync } from "node:zlib";
L23: import process$1 from "node:process";
L24: //#region ../../packages/client/dist/pi-diagnostic-stderr-BooG6GgA.mjs
L25: const PI_STARTUP_TIMING_PREFIX = "opentag-pi-startup:";
...
L814: success: true,
L815: data: result.value
L816: };
```

### 9. Critical: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs>)

Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L34399: code: number$1().int(),
L34400: stdout: string(),
L34401: stderr: string()
...
L34409: request.on("timeout", () => request.destroy(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("Context Tree command timed out")));
L34410: request.end(JSON.stringify({ args }));
L34411: });
...
L34413: const CONTEXT_TREE_COMMAND_CLIENT_SOURCE = `
L34414: import http from 'node:http';
L34415: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L34416: import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
```

### 10. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs>)

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
async function linkclaudeskills(pluginpath, paths, cwd) {
	const root = join(pluginpath, "skills");
	const nativeroot = cwd ? await realpath(resolve(cwd, ".claude", "skills")).catch((error) => {
		logger$17.debug({
			code: "claude_native_skills_unavailable",
			reason: string(error)
		}, "no native skill root");
	}) : void 0;
	await mkdir(root, {
		recursive: true,
		mode: 448
	});
	const installed =                 new set();
	for (const path of new set(paths)) try {
		if (nativeroot && nativeroot === await realpath(dirname(resolve(path)))) continue;
		const parsed = parseskillmanifest(await readfile(join(path, "skill.md"), "utf8"));
		if (!parsed.ok) throw new error(parsed.re
```

### 11. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> dist/cli/index.mjs -> dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
L10: import { access, chmod, copyFile, cp, link, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, opendir, readFile, readdir, readlink, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, symlink, unlink, writeFile } from ...
L11: import childProcess, { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12: import http, { createServer } from "node:http";
L13: import https, { Agent, request } from "node:https";
...
L21: import { pipeline } from "node:stream/promises";
L22: import { createGunzip, gunzipSync } from "node:zlib";
L23: import process$1 from "node:process";
L24: //#region ../../packages/client/dist/pi-diagnostic-stderr-BooG6GgA.mjs
L25: const PI_STARTUP_TIMING_PREFIX = "opentag-pi-startup:";
...
L814: success: true,
L815: data: resu
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/cli/index.mjs -> dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
L10: import { access, chmod, copyFile, cp, link, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, opendir, readFile, readdir, readlink, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, symlink, unlink, writeFile } from ...
L11: import childProcess, { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12: import http, { createServer } from "node:http";
L13: import https, { Agent, request } from "node:https";
...
L21: import { pipeline } from "node:stream/promises";
L22: import { createGunzip, gunzipSync } from "node:zlib";
L23: import process$1 from "node:process";
L24: //#region ../../packages/client/dist/pi-diagnostic-stderr-BooG6GgA.mjs
L25: const PI_STARTUP_TIMING_PREFIX = "opentag-pi-startup:";
...
L814: success
```

### 13. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.23.1/dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/cli/index.mjs -> dist/program-CgFHTIDg.mjs
L34399: code: number$1().int(),
L34400: stdout: string(),
L34401: stderr: string()
...
L34409: request.on("timeout", () => request.destroy(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("Context Tree command timed out")));
L34410: request.end(JSON.stringify({ args }));
L34411: });
...
L34413: const CONTEXT_TREE_COMMAND_CLIENT_SOURCE = `
L34414: import http from 'node:http';
L34415: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L34416: import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
```

### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 15. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 16. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 17. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 1
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 5
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1

### Published dependency entries
- @first-tree-ai/context-tree 1.1.1 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** open-tag-staging
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.1.7-staging.23.1
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-11-13T08:57:19.744Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-17T10:37:26.283Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T13:30:05.386Z
- **Known versions:** 462
- **Latest version:** 0.1.7-staging.142.1
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** openTag command-line interface for connecting team messaging with AI coding agents.
- **Maintainers:** dev-unispark.ai
- **Keywords:** ai, cli, coding-agent, messaging, opentag
- **Runtime engines:** node: ^22.22.2 || ^24.15.0 || ^26.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 22
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 11,034,219 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/open-tag-staging/v/0.1.7-staging.23.1>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/first-tree-ai/opentag>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/first-tree-ai/opentag#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/first-tree-ai/opentag/issues>)
