---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/open-tag-staging/v/0.1.7-staging.92.1"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/open-tag-staging/v/0.1.7-staging.92.1.md"
package: "open-tag-staging"
report_status: "published"
title: "open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.1.7-staging.92.1"
---

# open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.1.7-staging.92.1
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The package’s dependency automatically installs its own agent skills on direct global installation, which warrants a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk. The flagged credential flows do not establish theft: the Anthropic probe uses Anthropic’s own API endpoint, and the Slack download config is for Slack file downloads.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-18T20:19:26.828Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-18T20:21:53.459Z
- **Download time:** 767 ms
- **Static scan time:** 18055 ms
- **AI review time:** 127808 ms
- **Total time:** 146631 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** A dependency postinstall can add the dependency’s own skills to detected agent installations during a direct global install.

- **Trigger:** Dependency postinstall during direct global npm installation; it skips installs where the dependency is nested inside another package.

- **Impact:** Agent skill configuration changes without a separate skills-install command. The reviewed code does not establish credential theft or other malicious behavior.

- **Evidence paths:** .lpm-dependency-evidence-a2160fea-291a-4eb4-9f20-f2d98474c3f4/0/npm-linux/scripts/postinstall.mjs, .lpm-dependency-evidence-a2160fea-291a-4eb4-9f20-f2d98474c3f4/0/npm-linux/dist/cli/index.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-18T20:21:53.459Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The hook starts the dependency CLI with \`skills install\`, which copies its packaged skills into detected agent skill directories and replaces only its own prefixed skill directories.

- **Rationale:** The package’s dependency automatically installs its own agent skills on direct global installation, which warrants a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk. The flagged credential flows do not establish theft: the Anthropic probe uses Anthropic’s own API endpoint, and the Slack download config is for Slack file downloads.

- **Files touched:** ~/.claude/skills/context-tree-\*, ~/.agents/skills/context-tree-\*

- **Network endpoints:** https://api.anthropic.com/v1/models?limit=1

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 88.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Unknown

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The package depends on @first-tree-ai/context-tree, whose postinstall runs its CLI skill installer during a direct global install., The installer copies the dependency’s packaged skills into agent skill directories and replaces only directories with its own context-tree-\* prefix.

- **Evidence against:** The automatic skill installation is limited to direct global installs; dependency installs print instructions instead of writing to agent directories., The Anthropic credential probe sends its credential to the fixed https://api.anthropic.com models endpoint; the Slack token config is described for Slack file downloads., No credential exfiltration to the unrelated hosts named by the scanner was established.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1.

- Review the evidence and your use of open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: import { access, chmod, copyFile, cp, link, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, opendir, readFile, readdir, readlink, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, symlink, unlink, writeFile } from ...
L11: import childProcess, { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12: import http, { createServer, request } from "node:http";
```

### 3. High: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L110: try {
L111: new Function("");
L112: return true;
```

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L36986: const CONTEXT_TREE_COMMAND_CLIENT_SOURCE = `
L36987: import http from 'node:http';
L36988: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L36989: import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
...
L36991: const managed = args[0] === 'sync' || args[0] === 'write';
L36992: const manifest = process.env.OPENTAG_CONTEXT_TREE_MANIFEST;
L36993: let environment = process.env;
```

### 8. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: import { access, chmod, copyFile, cp, link, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, opendir, readFile, readdir, readlink, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, symlink, unlink, writeFile } from ...
L11: import childProcess, { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12: import http, { createServer, request } from "node:http";
L13: import https, { Agent, request as request$1 } from "node:https";
...
L21: import { SCHEMA_VERSION, projectConfigSchema, writeSessionSchema } from "@first-tree-ai/context-tree/contracts";
L22: import { createGunzip, gunzipSync } from "node:zlib";
L23: import process$1 from "node:process";
L24: //#region ../../packages/client/dist/pi-diagnostic-stderr-BooG6GgA.mjs
L25: const PI_STARTUP_TIMING_PREFIX = "opentag-pi-startup:";
...
L814: success: true,
L815: data: result.v
```

### 9. Critical: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L36972: code: number$1().int(),
L36973: stdout: string(),
L36974: stderr: string()
...
L36982: request.on("timeout", () => request.destroy(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("Context Tree command timed out")));
L36983: request.end(JSON.stringify({ args }));
L36984: });
...
L36986: const CONTEXT_TREE_COMMAND_CLIENT_SOURCE = `
L36987: import http from 'node:http';
L36988: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L36989: import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
```

### 10. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation.
async function linkclaudeskills(pluginpath, paths, cwd) {
	const root = join(pluginpath, "skills");
	const nativeroot = cwd ? await realpath(resolve(cwd, ".claude", "skills")).catch((error) => {
		logger$17.debug({
			code: "claude_native_skills_unavailable",
			reason: string(error)
		}, "no native skill root");
	}) : void 0;
	await mkdir(root, {
		recursive: true,
		mode: 448
	});
	const installed =                 new set();
	for (const path of new set(paths)) try {
		if (nativeroot && nativeroot === await realpath(dirname(resolve(path)))) continue;
		const parsed = parseskillmanifest(await readfile(join(path, "skill.md"), "utf8"));
		if (!parsed.ok) throw new error(parsed.re
```

### 11. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> dist/cli/index.mjs -> dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs
L10: import { access, chmod, copyFile, cp, link, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, opendir, readFile, readdir, readlink, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, symlink, unlink, writeFile } from ...
L11: import childProcess, { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12: import http, { createServer, request } from "node:http";
L13: import https, { Agent, request as request$1 } from "node:https";
...
L21: import { SCHEMA_VERSION, projectConfigSchema, writeSessionSchema } from "@first-tree-ai/context-tree/contracts";
L22: import { createGunzip, gunzipSync } from "node:zlib";
L23: import process$1 from "node:process";
L24: //#region ../../packages/client/dist/pi-diagnostic-stderr-BooG6GgA.mjs
L25: const PI_ST
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/cli/index.mjs -> dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs
L10: import { access, chmod, copyFile, cp, link, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, opendir, readFile, readdir, readlink, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, symlink, unlink, writeFile } from ...
L11: import childProcess, { execFile, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L12: import http, { createServer, request } from "node:http";
L13: import https, { Agent, request as request$1 } from "node:https";
...
L21: import { SCHEMA_VERSION, projectConfigSchema, writeSessionSchema } from "@first-tree-ai/context-tree/contracts";
L22: import { createGunzip, gunzipSync } from "node:zlib";
L23: import process$1 from "node:process";
L24: //#region ../../packages/client/dist/pi-diagnostic-stderr-BooG6
```

### 13. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/program-CRM8Ek0\_.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/open-tag-staging@0.1.7-staging.92.1/dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/cli/index.mjs -> dist/program-CRM8Ek0_.mjs
L36972: code: number$1().int(),
L36973: stdout: string(),
L36974: stderr: string()
...
L36982: request.on("timeout", () => request.destroy(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("Context Tree command timed out")));
L36983: request.end(JSON.stringify({ args }));
L36984: });
...
L36986: const CONTEXT_TREE_COMMAND_CLIENT_SOURCE = `
L36987: import http from 'node:http';
L36988: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L36989: import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
```

### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 15. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 16. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 17. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 1
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 5
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1

### Published dependency entries
- @first-tree-ai/context-tree 1.1.1 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** open-tag-staging
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.1.7-staging.92.1
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-11-18T20:17:52.107Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-17T10:37:26.283Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T13:30:05.386Z
- **Known versions:** 462
- **Latest version:** 0.1.7-staging.142.1
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** openTag command-line interface for connecting team messaging with AI coding agents.
- **Maintainers:** dev-unispark.ai
- **Keywords:** ai, cli, coding-agent, messaging, opentag
- **Runtime engines:** node: ^22.22.2 || ^24.15.0 || ^26.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 22
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 11,367,546 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/open-tag-staging/v/0.1.7-staging.92.1>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/first-tree-ai/opentag>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/first-tree-ai/opentag#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/first-tree-ai/opentag/issues>)
