openai-agents-helpers@1.3.2

On `npm install`, scripts/postinstall.js reads installer-side identity and cloud-context data from the host and uploads it via HTTPS POST to a hardcoded non-publisher endpoint. Specifically, the script reads ~/.ssh/*.pub (extracting email comments that map SSH keys to identities), ~/.aws/config (profile names and SSO config), ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml (GitHub CLI user/email), ~/.config/gcloud/properties (GCP account email and project), /etc/resolv.conf search domain, git config user.email and reflog committer emails, the parent project's package.json (name/author/repo), os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, USERDOMAIN, cwd, and CI provider, then POSTs a JSON body to https://npm-package-logger-228835561205.europe-west1.run.app/. The package presents itself as 'openai-agents-helpers' with author 'OpenAI Agents JS Guide' and homepage openai-agents-js.guide, depending on @openai/agents, but the destination is not OpenAI infrastructure and the brand framing lures installers expecting first-party tooling. The harvested data (SSH-key→identity mapping, AWS profile names, GCP account email, GitHub login, repo authorship, hostname/username) is high-value reconnaissance for targeted phishing and account takeover, fires automatically on default install with no opt-in, and reads installer-secret-adjacent directories the package has no business touching. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6303be8ee54533f33251590555db82063d5274b4d11a626603cca87c849e7807) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.