openclaw-channel-shareopen@1.3.13
ShareOpen IM channel plugin for OpenClaw — agent-to-agent messaging with slash-command menu, approval fences, and model picker.
AI Security Review
scanned 7h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inbound-media path sends the configured ShareOpen bearer token to the origin supplied in the media URL, with no service-host validation. This is a concrete credential-exfiltration path triggered while handling inbound media.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The plugin is running and processes an inbound ShareOpen message with media.url, media.file_id, and a configured account token.
Impact
A crafted external media URL can disclose the ShareOpen agent token to a host controlled by the message sender.
Mechanism
The media downloader derives the request origin from media.url and sends account.token in an Authorization: Bearer header to that origin without an origin allowlist.
Attack narrative
When processing inbound media, the plugin passes the media URL as the request base and the configured agent token as the token. The downloader extracts the URL’s HTTP(S) origin and sends a bearer-authenticated request there, without checking that the origin belongs to ShareOpen. A sender able to supply media metadata can therefore direct the token to an attacker-controlled host.
AI rationale
The inbound-media path sends the configured ShareOpen bearer token to the origin supplied in the media URL, with no service-host validation. This is a concrete credential-exfiltration path triggered while handling inbound media.
Evidence
index.js
Network endpoints2
Arbitrary HTTP(S) origin supplied as inbound media.urlshareopen.com (fallback for relative URLs)
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 97.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package loads index.js as its main and OpenClaw extension entry point.
- The WebSocket handler routes inbound messages containing media to the plugin’s inbound handler.
- The media downloader derives its request host from the media URL without restricting it to the ShareOpen service.
- The inbound-media caller passes media.url as the base URL and account.token as the bearer token; the downloader sends that token to the derived host.
Evidence against
- Fetching inbound media and sending an agent token to the ShareOpen media service are part of the channel’s stated function.
- The downloader falls back to https://shareopen.com only when the supplied URL has no HTTP(S) host; absolute external URLs determine the request host.
Behavioral surface
CryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedindex.jsView file
3L4: import WebSocket from 'ws';
L5: import fs from 'node:fs';
...
L30: if (!name || !SHARE_COMMANDS.some((c) => c.name === name.toLowerCase())) return undefined;
L31: return { kind: 'text-slash', source: 'text', authorized: true, commandName: name || undefined, body: b };
L32: }
...
L101: try {
L102: const p = path.join(os.homedir(), '.openclaw', 'openclaw.json');
L103: const j = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8'));
L104: return j && j.channels ? j : null;
...
L286: let p = mediaUrl;
L287: if (p.startsWith('~')) p = p.replace(/^~(?=[/\\]|$)/, process.env.HOME || '');
Critical
Remote Asset Decode Execute
Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.
index.jsView on unpkg · L3•Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js
Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern.
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
index.jsView on unpkg521} else if ((type === 'message' && (msg.data?.message || msg.data?.media)) || (type === 'text_message' && (msg.content || msg.media))) {
// Inbound user message from ShareOpen backend — route to the OpenClaw agent.
// Real-time shape: {type:'message', data:{conversation_id, message, media?, user_id, message_id}}
// Queued-replay shape: {type:'text_message', conversation_id, content, media?
Findings
2 Critical3 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalRemote Asset Decode Executeindex.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityindex.js
HighAi Review Evidencepackage.json
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowWeak Cryptoindex.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to openclaw-channel-shareopen@1.3.13.
See all versions of openclaw-channel-shareopen for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing openclaw-channel-shareopen@1.3.13. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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