registry / opencode-skills-collection / 4.0.76

opencode-skills-collection@4.0.76

OpenCode CLI plugin that automatically downloads and keeps skills up to date.

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package performs automatic OpenCode extension setup and mutation at runtime, which is a guarded agent-extension lifecycle risk. The inspected source does not show a concrete malicious attack chain.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Loading the OpenCode plugin during OpenCode startup.

Impact

It can change which package-provided skills are available to the OpenCode agent and removes obsolete entries from its package-owned vault.

Mechanism

It creates skill directories, copies bundled skills to its vault, removes stale vault entries, and writes category pointer SKILL.md files.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/index.jsdist/skill-pointer/index.jsdist/skill-pointer/vault-installer.jsdist/skill-pointer/pointer-generator.js~/.config/opencode/skills~/.config/opencode/skill-libraries

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package has no install lifecycle hook; its only listed lifecycle-like script is prepublishOnly.
The plugin entrypoint creates the OpenCode skills directory and runs its skill-pointer pipeline when loaded.
The pipeline creates a vault under the OpenCode configuration directory.
The vault updater recursively removes skills absent from the current bundled index.
The pointer generator writes SKILL.md files into the active skills directory.

Evidence against

No network endpoint, credential collection, or command execution was found in the inspected active entrypoint paths.
The observed configuration writes are limited to OpenCode skill-library and category-pointer locations.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

13 flagged

bundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

bundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

Secret Pattern

Stripe test secret key in bundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

bundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

bundled-skills/playwright-skill/run.jsView file

14const path = require('path'); L15: const { execSync } = require('child_process'); L16: const sanitizeFilename = require('sanitize-filename');

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bundled-skills/playwright-skill/run.jsView on unpkg · L14

12L13: const fs = require('fs'); L14: const path = require('path');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bundled-skills/playwright-skill/run.jsView on unpkg · L12

bundled-skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjsView file

133console.log(`Building (${config.build})...`) L134: const built = spawnSync(config.build, { cwd: PROJECT_ROOT, stdio: 'inherit', shell: true }) L135: if (built.status !== 0) fail(`'${config.build}' failed.`)

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

bundled-skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjsView on unpkg · L133

7Cross-file remote execution chain: bundled-skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjs spawns bundled-skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/daemon.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L7: */ L8: import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process' L9: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, rmSync, statSync } from 'node:fs' L10: import http from 'node:http' L11: import path from 'node:path' ... L73: try { L74: const parsed = JSON.parse(data) L75: if (parsed.ok) resolve(parsed.result) ... L83: request.on('error', reject) L84: request.end(body) L85: }) ... L111: if (!existsSync(resolved) || !statSync(resolved).isDirectory()) return resolved

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

bundled-skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjsView on unpkg · L7

bundled-skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.jsView file

98const apiActorId = actorId.replace('/', '~'); L99: const url = `https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/${apiActorId}/runs?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`; L100: ... L102: try { L103: data = JSON.parse(inputJson); L104: } catch (e) { ... L114: }, L115: body: JSON.stringify(data), L116: }); ... L321: // Check for APIFY_TOKEN L322: const token = process.env.APIFY_TOKEN; L323: if (!token) {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

bundled-skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.jsView on unpkg · L98

bundled-skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsxView file

39L40: const token = process.env.HF_TOKEN; L41: const headers: Record<string, string> = token ... L44: L45: const url = `https://huggingface.co/api/models?limit=${limit}`; L46: ... L54: L55: const text = await res.text(); L56: process.stdout.write(text); L57: })();

High

Credential Exfiltration

Source combines credential-like environment material and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

bundled-skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsxView on unpkg · L39

bundled-skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.pyView file

•path = bundled-skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 24204 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

bundled-skills/gemini-deep-research/scripts/research.pyView on unpkg

bundled-skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gzView file

•path = bundled-skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gz kind = compressed_blob sizeBytes = 19967 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Compressed Blob

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

bundled-skills/web-artifacts-builder/scripts/shadcn-components.tar.gzView on unpkg

bundled-skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdfView file

•path = bundled-skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf kind = high_entropy_blob sizeBytes = 124310 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Ships High Entropy Blob

Package ships high-entropy non-source blobs.

bundled-skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdfView on unpkg

bundled-skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.shView file

•path = bundled-skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 1740 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

bundled-skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.shView on unpkg

bundled-skills/go-in-depth/scripts/workflow-script.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

bundled-skills/go-in-depth/scripts/workflow-script.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

13 flagged · loading source

bundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView file

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

bundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

165patternName = stripe_test_secret severity = high line = 165

High

Secret Pattern

Stripe test secret key in bundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

bundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.mdView on unpkg · L165

bundled-skills/playwright-skill/run.jsView file

14const path = require('path'); L15: const { execSync } = require('child_process'); L16: const sanitizeFilename = require('sanitize-filename');

High

Findings

1 Critical9 High7 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationbundled-skills/apify-content-analytics/reference/scripts/run_actor.js

HighHigh Secretbundled-skills/developer-signup-flow/SKILL.md

HighChild Processbundled-skills/playwright-skill/run.js

HighShellbundled-skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjs

HighCredential Exfiltrationbundled-skills/huggingface-tool-builder/references/baseline_hf_api.tsx

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextbundled-skills/electron-drive-skill/scripts/drive.mjs

HighShips High Entropy Blobbundled-skills/theme-factory/theme-showcase.pdf

HighPayload In Excluded Dirbundled-skills/fedora-hyprland-installer/tests/test-scripts.sh

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedbundled-skills/go-in-depth/scripts/workflow-script.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to opencode-skills-collection@4.0.76.

See all versions of opencode-skills-collection for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of opencode-skills-collection@4.0.76 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-28 02:25:35.633Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code