openyida@2026.10.20
OpenYida CLI - 宜搭低代码 AI 开发工具(安装即用,零配置)
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook performs unprompted agent setup, including enabling a Codex plugin, so residual lifecycle risk remains. The source identifies this as a package-owned local plugin and the inspected excerpts do not establish a block-level attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/postinstall.js automatically after installation.
- The hook always copies skills into the user's Claude directory; when Codex is present, it installs skills and a local OpenYida plugin, then refreshes that plugin.
- The hook enables the OpenYida Codex plugin in config.toml and writes a local marketplace entry without an affirmative setup prompt.
- The Codex plugin setup writes under the user's home directory and invokes Codex's plugin-add command.
- The doctor target only reads installed skill metadata to check its version.
- The Codex setup is conditional on an existing Codex directory and creates a package-owned local marketplace.
- The inspected hook and doctor excerpts show no credential collection or transfer.
Source & flagged code
21 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
lib/app/canvas-compile.jsView on unpkg · L18Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to openyida@2026.10.20.
See all versions of openyida for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of openyida@2026.10.20 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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