osborn@0.9.159
Voice AI coding assistant - local agent that connects to Osborn frontend
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a concrete runtime remote-code-execution exposure and remote shell-install path, but the inspected code does not establish theft or a covert malicious purpose. It should be warned and remediated rather than published as clean.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Run the CLI with required LiveKit variables, then request GET /editor.
Impact
A network client able to reach the server can obtain an editor session and potentially execute commands in the agent workspace.
Mechanism
Unauthenticated remote installer and code-server proxy.
AI rationale
This is a concrete runtime remote-code-execution exposure and remote shell-install path, but the inspected code does not establish theft or a covert malicious purpose. It should be warned and remediated rather than published as clean.
Evidence
dist/index.jsdist/claude-llm.js~/.claude/settings.json
Network endpoints2
code-server.dev127.0.0.1:8300
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The runtime HTTP server listens on all interfaces by default.
- An unauthenticated GET /editor route starts the IDE; its own comment says authentication is future work.
- Starting the IDE downloads and executes a remote shell installer when code-server is absent.
- The downloaded IDE is launched with authentication disabled, then exposed through the server proxy.
- Importing the Claude integration changes settings in the user's Claude configuration.
Evidence against
- package.json has only a prepublish hook, not an install-time lifecycle hook.
- The package's network calls and credential use are primarily for its stated voice-agent and meeting features.
- No source showed secret collection followed by an attacker-controlled exfiltration endpoint.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcebin/cli.jsView file
2L3: import { spawn } from 'child_process'
L4: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'
High
dist/jsonl-search.jsView file
34// @vscode/ripgrep bundles the rg binary — this is our own dependency
L35: const { rgPath } = require('@vscode/ripgrep');
L36: if (rgPath && existsSync(rgPath))
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/jsonl-search.jsView on unpkg · L34dist/index.jsView file
2456const which = await new Promise((res) => {
L2457: const p = spawn('which', ['code-server']);
L2458: let out = '';
...
L2465: await new Promise((res, rej) => {
L2466: const install = spawn('sh', ['-c', 'curl -fsSL https://code-server.dev/install.sh | sh'], {
L2467: env: { ...process.env },
L2468: stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
Findings
5 Critical3 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalDownload Executedist/index.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/index.js
HighChild Processbin/cli.js
HighShell
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/session-access.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumDynamic Requiredist/jsonl-search.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperdeploy.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to osborn@0.9.159.
See all versions of osborn for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of osborn@0.9.159 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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