registry / Remote code execution / osborn / 0.9.165

osborn@0.9.165

Voice AI coding assistant - local agent that connects to Osborn frontend

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

This is a critical runtime remote-code-execution exposure and an AI-agent persistence risk, not confirmed malicious package-install behavior. The appropriate upstream action is a warning pending remediation of authentication and pinned installation.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A request to GET /editor on a running agent when code-server is not installed, or a Claude compaction event.

Impact

An attacker able to reach the agent API can cause execution of whatever the remote installer serves; generated content can persist in the user's Claude skills.

Mechanism

Unauthenticated remote script execution and automatic Claude skill writes.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/index.jsdist/claude-llm.js/workspace~/.claude/skills/decisions/SKILL.md~/.claude/skills/learned-behaviors/SKILL.md

Network endpoints1

code-server.dev/install.sh

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 94.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The public editor route explicitly lacks an authentication gate and starts the IDE hook.
Starting that hook downloads a remote shell script and pipes it to sh when code-server is absent.
A compaction hook writes model-produced content into Claude skill files under the user home directory.
The HTTP API permits cross-origin requests from any origin.

Evidence against

The manifest has only a prepublish build hook, not an install-time lifecycle hook.
There is no runtime dependency on osborn itself.
The package is a voice coding agent, so its normal runtime use legitimately involves local files, subprocesses, and AI service APIs.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

bin/cli.jsView file

2L3: import { spawn } from 'child_process' L4: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg · L2

dist/jsonl-search.jsView file

34// @vscode/ripgrep bundles the rg binary — this is our own dependency L35: const { rgPath } = require('@vscode/ripgrep'); L36: if (rgPath && existsSync(rgPath))

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/jsonl-search.jsView on unpkg · L34

dist/index.jsView file

2456const which = await new Promise((res) => { L2457: const p = spawn('which', ['code-server']); L2458: let out = ''; ... L2465: await new Promise((res, rej) => { L2466: const install = spawn('sh', ['-c', 'curl -fsSL https://code-server.dev/install.sh | sh'], { L2467: env: { ...process.env }, L2468: stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],

Critical

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L2456

11setMaxListeners(50); L12: import { createServer, request as httpRequest } from 'http'; L13: import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, mkdtempSync, cpSync, rmSync, statSync, utimesSync, createWriteStream } from 'node:fs'; ... L15: import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; L16: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L17: import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; ... L19: import { createRequire } from 'node:module'; L20: // 0.9.71: createRequire for resolving package.json versions inside ESM L21: const __sdkVersionRequire = createRequire(import.meta.url); ... L23: import { PassThrough } from 'node:stream'; L24: import { createGunzip } from 'node:zlib'; L25: // Resolve __dirname for this ESM module so we can find sibling files (e.g.

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11

2456const which = await new Promise((res) => { L2457: const p = spawn('which', ['code-server']); L2458: let out = ''; L2459: p.stdout?.on('data', (d) => { out += d.toString(); }); L2460: p.on('close', () => res(out.trim())); ... L2465: await new Promise((res, rej) => { L2466: const install = spawn('sh', ['-c', 'curl -fsSL https://code-server.dev/install.sh | sh'], { L2467: env: { ...process.env }, ... L2469: }); L2470: install.stdout?.on('data', (d) => process.stdout.write(d)); L2471: install.stderr?.on('data', (d) => process.stderr.write(d));

Critical

Command Output Exfiltration

Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L2456

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L11

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = osborn@0.9.190 matchedIdentity = npm:b3Nib3Ju:0.9.190 similarity = 0.714 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

deploy.shView file

•path = deploy.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2309 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

deploy.shView on unpkg

dist/session-access.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/session-access.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

bin/cli.jsView file

2L3: import { spawn } from 'child_process' L4: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/cli.jsView on unpkg · L2

dist/jsonl-search.jsView file

34// @vscode/ripgrep bundles the rg binary — this is our own dependency L35: const { rgPath } = require('@vscode/ripgrep'); L36: if (rgPath && existsSync(rgPath))

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/jsonl-search.jsView on unpkg · L34

dist/index.jsView file

Findings

5 Critical3 High5 Medium5 Low

CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js

CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

CriticalDownload Executedist/index.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/index.js

HighChild Processbin/cli.js

HighShell

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/session-access.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumDynamic Requiredist/jsonl-search.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperdeploy.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to osborn@0.9.165.

See all versions of osborn for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of osborn@0.9.165 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-14 04:20:41.635Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code