osborn@0.9.167
Voice AI coding assistant - local agent that connects to Osborn frontend
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no registry-install lifecycle hook, but its runtime artifact-upload handler lacks path containment and can upload arbitrary local files to a configurable endpoint. This is a serious exploitable data-exfiltration flaw rather than evidence of autonomous malware.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A connected frontend participant sends a get_research_artifact message with a crafted filePath while a frontend URL is configured.
Impact
An attacker able to use that message channel and influence or access the configured frontend can obtain arbitrary readable local files.
Mechanism
Path traversal local-file read followed by HTTP file upload.
AI rationale
The package has no registry-install lifecycle hook, but its runtime artifact-upload handler lacks path containment and can upload arbitrary local files to a configurable endpoint. This is a serious exploitable data-exfiltration flaw rather than evidence of autonomous malware.
Evidence
dist/index.jsuser-supplied filePath
Network endpoints1
${OSBORN_FRONTEND_URL}/api/upload
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- A frontend data message can supply a path that is checked only by substring before the file is read.
- The selected file is posted to an endpoint derived from an environment variable.
- The path check does not enforce containment, so traversal from an allowed-looking path can reach unrelated local files.
Evidence against
- There is no install-time hook; the only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly.
- The command-line launcher starts the agent only after the user runs the CLI.
- The upload is in a named research-artifact request path, indicating an intended file-sharing feature rather than automatic harvesting.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcebin/cli.jsView file
2L3: import { spawn } from 'child_process'
L4: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'
High
dist/jsonl-search.jsView file
34// @vscode/ripgrep bundles the rg binary — this is our own dependency
L35: const { rgPath } = require('@vscode/ripgrep');
L36: if (rgPath && existsSync(rgPath))
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/jsonl-search.jsView on unpkg · L34dist/index.jsView file
2456const which = await new Promise((res) => {
L2457: const p = spawn('which', ['code-server']);
L2458: let out = '';
...
L2465: await new Promise((res, rej) => {
L2466: const install = spawn('sh', ['-c', 'curl -fsSL https://code-server.dev/install.sh | sh'], {
L2467: env: { ...process.env },
L2468: stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
Findings
5 Critical3 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalDownload Executedist/index.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/index.js
HighChild Processbin/cli.js
HighShell
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/session-access.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumDynamic Requiredist/jsonl-search.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperdeploy.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to osborn@0.9.167.
See all versions of osborn for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of osborn@0.9.167 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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