osborn@0.9.173
Voice AI coding assistant - local agent that connects to Osborn frontend
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a risky voice-agent runtime with global Claude mutations and a remote shell installer, but inspection found no install-time execution or confirmed credential exfiltration. The capabilities merit a warning rather than a malware block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes an executable CLI, while registry installation has only a prepublish build hook.
- When the IDE feature is requested and code-server is absent, runtime pipes downloaded code into sh.
- Importing the Claude LLM module changes the user's ~/.claude/settings.json.
- A post-compaction hook writes model-extracted content into ~/.claude/skills/*.
- The code-server download is reachable through the start_ide runtime request.
- No preinstall, install, or postinstall hook is present.
- No source evidence showed credential harvesting or secret exfiltration.
- The remote installer and skill operations are runtime features, not automatic install-time behavior.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/jsonl-search.jsView on unpkg · L34Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to osborn@0.9.173.
See all versions of osborn for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of osborn@0.9.173 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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