osborn@0.9.186
Voice AI coding assistant - local agent that connects to Osborn frontend
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete malicious npm lifecycle behavior was found, but the user-triggered remote installer and permission-bypassing agent subprocess create a meaningful dangerous capability. Downgrade to a warning rather than block publication.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user-connected frontend sends the start_ide request, or starts a background Claude session.
Impact
A compromised installer or unsafe agent request could execute with the user's environment and filesystem access.
Mechanism
Remote shell installer and privileged AI-agent subprocess.
AI rationale
No concrete malicious npm lifecycle behavior was found, but the user-triggered remote installer and permission-bypassing agent subprocess create a meaningful dangerous capability. Downgrade to a warning rather than block publication.
Evidence
dist/index.jsdist/session-access.js~/.claude
Network endpoints2
code-server.devopenrouter.ai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The running agent can download and execute a remote installer when an IDE-start request finds code-server missing.
- It passes the complete process environment to a headless Claude session configured to bypass permissions.
- The agent reads Claude session data from the user home directory and can upload selected research artifacts to a configured frontend.
- The manifest contains only a prepublish hook, so this behavior is not automatically triggered during npm installation.
Evidence against
- No preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook is present.
- The remote installer is reached from the explicit start_ide runtime path, not package installation.
- The OpenRouter request uses the configured API key as authentication for the declared assistant service.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcebin/cli.jsView file
2L3: import { spawn } from 'child_process'
L4: import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'
High
dist/jsonl-search.jsView file
34// @vscode/ripgrep bundles the rg binary — this is our own dependency
L35: const { rgPath } = require('@vscode/ripgrep');
L36: if (rgPath && existsSync(rgPath))
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/jsonl-search.jsView on unpkg · L34dist/index.jsView file
2455const which = await new Promise((res) => {
L2456: const p = spawn('which', ['code-server']);
L2457: let out = '';
...
L2464: await new Promise((res, rej) => {
L2465: const install = spawn('sh', ['-c', 'curl -fsSL https://code-server.dev/install.sh | sh'], {
L2466: env: { ...process.env },
L2467: stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
Findings
4 Critical3 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalDownload Executedist/index.js
HighChild Processbin/cli.js
HighShell
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/session-access.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumDynamic Requiredist/jsonl-search.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperdeploy.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to osborn@0.9.186.
See all versions of osborn for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of osborn@0.9.186 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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