osborn@0.9.228
Voice AI coding assistant - local agent that connects to Osborn frontend
AI Security Review
scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a concrete, user-invoked capability to mutate Claude Code configuration and skills. This warrants a warning, but the inspected source does not support a malicious install-hook or credential-theft conclusion.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines command-line binaries and has no install lifecycle hook.
- The Claude LLM module changes ~/.claude/settings.json values and invokes that routine at module load.
- The running service accepts a skill_add message and writes its supplied content into ~/.claude/skills.
- The package writes an OAuth token only into the local Claude configuration directory with restrictive file permissions.
- No source evidence showed install-time execution, remote payload loading, or credential transmission to an unrelated endpoint.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/jsonl-search.jsView on unpkg · L34Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to osborn@0.9.228.
See all versions of osborn for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of osborn@0.9.228 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.