---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/owlmem/v/0.7.6"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/owlmem/v/0.7.6.md"
package: "owlmem"
report_status: "published"
title: "owlmem@0.7.6 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.7.6"
---

# owlmem@0.7.6 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 13 finding(s) warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 0.7.6
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The source supports conditional exposure of an existing credential to an operator-configured endpoint, so a warning is appropriate. The default recipient is package-aligned, and the inspected source does not establish covert collection or malicious intent.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 88.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-27T20:56:12.421Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-27T20:57:50.720Z
- **Download time:** 506 ms
- **Static scan time:** 222 ms
- **AI review time:** 97570 ms
- **Total time:** 98299 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The client can expose its saved token if an operator configures OWLMEM\_URL to an unrelated host and then makes a request. No hidden recipient or install-time transfer was identified.

- **Trigger:** An operator sets OWLMEM\_URL to another host and invokes a CLI or MCP operation that makes a request.

- **Impact:** The configured host could receive a token usable to access the OwlMem account.

- **Evidence paths:** owlmem.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-27T20:57:50.720Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The request helper sends the token from the environment or local configuration in a bearer authorization header to the configured base URL.

- **Rationale:** The source supports conditional exposure of an existing credential to an operator-configured endpoint, so a warning is appropriate. The default recipient is package-aligned, and the inspected source does not establish covert collection or malicious intent.

- **Network endpoints:** https://owlmem.com

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 88.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The client defaults to https://owlmem.com, but OWLMEM\_URL can replace the request base; requests send the token from OWLMEM\_TOKEN or local configuration as a bearer credential., Credential-bearing calls support vault operations, MCP requests, and a command wrapper that loads user-selected vault values into a child process environment. These are runtime operations, not install hooks., The manifest exposes owlmem.mjs as a CLI and declares no lifecycle scripts.

- **Evidence against:** The inspected source does not show a hidden package-selected recipient: the default host is the OwlMem service, while another destination requires the operator to set OWLMEM\_URL., The reviewed callers use the shared request helper for vault and user-invoked client operations; no automatic install-time credential transfer is shown.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to owlmem@0.7.6.

- Review the evidence and your use of owlmem@0.7.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** owlmem.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/owlmem@0.7.6/owlmem.mjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L40: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L41: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L42:
```

### 2. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** owlmem.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/owlmem@0.7.6/owlmem.mjs>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L435: inputSchema: { type: "object", properties: {
L436: command: { type: "string", description: "Shell command to run (sh -c)" },
L437: env: { type: "object", description: 'Map of ENV_VAR to "item" or "item:field", e.g. {"DB_PASSWORD": "prod/db:password"}', additionalProperties: { type: "string" } },
```

### 3. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** owlmem.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/owlmem@0.7.6/owlmem.mjs>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L40: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L41: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L42: 
L43: export const VERSION = "0.7.6";
L44: const BASE = (process.env.OWLMEM_URL || "https://owlmem.com").replace(/\/$/, "");
L45: const DIR = process.env.OWLMEM_HOME || join(process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config"), "owlmem");
```

### 7. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** owlmem.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/owlmem@0.7.6/owlmem.mjs>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L40: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L41: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L42: 
L43: export const VERSION = "0.7.6";
L44: const BASE = (process.env.OWLMEM_URL || "https://owlmem.com").replace(/\/$/, "");
L45: const DIR = process.env.OWLMEM_HOME || join(process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config"), "owlmem");
L46: const enc = new TextEncoder(), dec = new TextDecoder();
L47: const say = (...a) => process.stderr.write(a.join(" ") + "\n");
L48: class Fail extends Error {}
```

### 8. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** owlmem.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/owlmem@0.7.6/owlmem.mjs>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L14: //   owlmem vault ls
L15: //   owlmem vault get <name> [field]      prints the item (or one field) to stdout
L16: //   owlmem vault put <name> [--desc text] < value-or-json
...
L40: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L41: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L42: 
L43: export const VERSION = "0.7.6";
L44: const BASE = (process.env.OWLMEM_URL || "https://owlmem.com").replace(/\/$/, "");
L45: const DIR = process.env.OWLMEM_HOME || join(process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config"), "owlmem");
L46: const enc = new TextEncoder(), dec = new TextDecoder();
L47: const say = (...a) => process.stderr.write(a.join(" ") + "\n");
L48: class Fail extends Error {}
```

### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** owlmem.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/owlmem@0.7.6/owlmem.mjs>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> owlmem.mjs
L40: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L41: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L42: 
L43: export const VERSION = "0.7.6";
L44: const BASE = (process.env.OWLMEM_URL || "https://owlmem.com").replace(/\/$/, "");
L45: const DIR = process.env.OWLMEM_HOME || join(process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config"), "owlmem");
L46: const enc = new TextEncoder(), dec = new TextDecoder();
L47: const say = (...a) => process.stderr.write(a.join(" ") + "\n");
L48: class Fail extends Error {}
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** owlmem.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/owlmem@0.7.6/owlmem.mjs>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** owlmem
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.7.6
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-10-27T20:55:38.503Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-10-24T02:02:01.165Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T14:12:35.712Z
- **Known versions:** 23
- **Latest version:** 0.9.15
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** OwlMem command line: connect your AI apps to OwlMem in one command (npx -y owlmem install), an end-to-end encrypted vault for your AI agents, and a local MCP server.
- **Maintainers:** owlmem
- **Keywords:** mcp, ai-agents, vault, secrets, claude, codex, cursor
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18
- **Artifact files:** 4
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 106,301 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/owlmem/v/0.7.6>)
- [Homepage](<https://owlmem.com/>)