owlmem@0.8.0
OwlMem command line: connect your AI apps to OwlMem in one command (npx -y owlmem install), an end-to-end encrypted vault for your AI agents, and a local MCP server.
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe default destination is the intended OwlMem service, but a custom OWLMEM_URL can redirect requests carrying the saved bearer token without a source-visible destination restriction. This supports a warning for conditional credential exposure, not a finding of package-controlled theft.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A CLI or MCP vault request is made while OWLMEM_URL points to a custom destination.
Impact
The custom destination could receive the OwlMem token and use it outside its intended service context.
Mechanism
The request helper attaches the token to requests sent to the configured base URL without an apparent destination allowlist.
AI rationale
The default destination is the intended OwlMem service, but a custom OWLMEM_URL can redirect requests carrying the saved bearer token without a source-visible destination restriction. This supports a warning for conditional credential exposure, not a finding of package-controlled theft.
Evidence
owlmem.mjs
Network endpoints1
owlmem.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 78.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The client reads its token from OWLMEM_TOKEN or local OwlMem configuration and sends it as a bearer credential with vault requests.
- OWLMEM_URL can replace the default OwlMem service base, and the source shows no destination restriction before sending the token.
- Vault and MCP callers reach the shared authenticated request path; the reviewed source does not establish that a custom endpoint is package-controlled.
Evidence against
- The default request destination is the OwlMem service, consistent with the package’s vault-client function.
- The manifest exposes a CLI entrypoint and contains no lifecycle script.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedowlmem.mjsView file
41import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L42: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L43:
High
436inputSchema: { type: "object", properties: {
L437: command: { type: "string", description: "Shell command to run (sh -c)" },
L438: env: { type: "object", description: 'Map of ENV_VAR to "item" or "item:field", e.g. {"DB_PASSWORD": "prod/db:password"}', additionalProperties: { type: "string" } },
High
41import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
L42: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L43:
L44: export const VERSION = "0.8.0";
L45: const BASE = (process.env.OWLMEM_URL || "https://owlmem.com").replace(/\/$/, "");
L46: const DIR = process.env.OWLMEM_HOME || join(process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config"), "owlmem");
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
owlmem.mjsView on unpkg · L41Findings
7 High3 Medium3 Low
HighChild Processowlmem.mjs
HighShellowlmem.mjs
HighSame File Env Network Executionowlmem.mjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationowlmem.mjs
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityowlmem.mjs
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationowlmem.mjs
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedowlmem.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to owlmem@0.8.0.
See all versions of owlmem for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of owlmem@0.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.