pandafortunerush@1.0.0
Defensive placeholder. Benign beacon only (single HTTP GET to researcher server), no functional code. Held to prevent dependency-confusion abuse of an internal project name exposed via a public package.json. Will be transferred to the owning organization
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe preinstall and postinstall hooks automatically transmit user and project environment data to an external IP address. This is install-time data exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Both preinstall and postinstall make HTTP GET requests to 38.242.235.206, sending the user name, hostname, and current working directory.
- The README confirms the install scripts send user, hostname, and working-directory data to a researcher server.
- The manifest describes the package as a defensive placeholder intended to protect an internal project name.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedInstall-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to pandafortunerush@1.0.0.
See all versions of pandafortunerush for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing pandafortunerush@1.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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