persnally@3.2.0
A model of you, built from your own AI history, on your machine. Every AI you use reads it. So every AI finally knows you.
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe daemon automatically processes new sessions and defaults to the paid Anthropic API whenever an API key is present. This background use of the user's key can incur charges and transmit private session text without per-run consent.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The daemon is running and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is available.
Impact
This can spend the user's API credits and disclose session contents to the model provider without per-run consent.
Mechanism
A 30-minute timer starts automatic imports. Engine selection defaults to Anthropic when the key is present, and the extractor submits conversation content to the Anthropic API.
Attack narrative
While the daemon runs, a timer automatically imports new AI sessions. If an Anthropic API key is available, engine selection chooses Anthropic by default and submits conversation text to its API. This uses the user's key and can incur charges while transmitting session contents without an explicit request for each import.
AI rationale
The daemon automatically processes new sessions and defaults to the paid Anthropic API whenever an API key is present. This background use of the user's key can incur charges and transmit private session text without per-run consent.
Evidence
build/src/daemon.jsbuild/src/importers/claude-code.jsbuild/src/llm.js
Network endpoints1
api.anthropic.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 91.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The daemon schedules new-session imports every 30 minutes while it is running.
- Automatic imports choose an extraction engine and pass it to the background import routine without a per-session user action.
- When ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is present, engine selection defaults to Anthropic.
- The Anthropic extractor sends the conversation content in a user message.
- The Anthropic SDK defaults to api.anthropic.com.
Evidence against
- Conversation extraction is a core package function; the README describes using the user's own model key or local Ollama.
- The README says text is sent to the model the user chooses.
- The background behavior requires the daemon to be running; the manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedbuild/src/importers/git.jsView file
5*/
L6: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
L7: import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "node:fs";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
build/src/importers/git.jsView on unpkg · L5build/src/lifecycle.jsView file
54ensurePrivateFile(LOG_FILE);
L55: const child = spawn(process.execPath, [cliPath, "serve", "--port", String(port)], {
L56: detached: true,
L57: stdio: ["ignore", log, log],
L58: env: process.env,
L59: });
...
L64: try {
L65: const r = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/health`);
L66: if (r.ok)
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
build/src/lifecycle.jsView on unpkg · L545*/
L6: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process";
L7: import { closeSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readFileSync, rmSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
...
L9: import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
L10: import { DATA_DIR, ensurePrivateDir, ensurePrivateFile } from "./paths.js";
L11: const PID_FILE = join(DATA_DIR, "daemon.pid");
...
L13: const PLIST_LABEL = "com.persnally.daemon";
L14: const PLIST_PATH = join(homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${PLIST_LABEL}.plist`);
L15: const UNIT_NAME = "persnally.service";
...
L17: function unitPath() {
L18: return join(process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME ?? join(homedir(), ".config"), "systemd", "user", UNIT_NAME);
L19: }
Findings
1 Critical8 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltabuild/src/cli.js
HighChild Processbuild/src/importers/git.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executionbuild/src/lifecycle.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationbuild/src/cli.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitybuild/src/lifecycle.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationbuild/src/cli.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencebuild/src/lifecycle.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedbuild/src/cli.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistence
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to persnally@3.2.0.
See all versions of persnally for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing persnally@3.2.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.