registry / pfp-integration-mobile-heading / 20.7.1

pfp-integration-mobile-heading@20.7.1

device integration

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing the package automatically launches a remote payload bootstrapper. It fetches an OS-specific binary or DNS-delivered bytes, writes it to temporary storage, and executes it detached.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Any runtime require/import of the package entrypoint.

Impact

Arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes as the importing process user.

Mechanism

import-time remote binary download, drop, chmod, and detached execution

Attack narrative

A consumer merely requiring index.js causes _bootstrap.js to run. It selects a platform-specific URL across obfuscated workers.dev hosts, or obtains base64 bytes through DNS TXT records, then writes the response to a temporary executable path and launches it with a detached shell or cmd.exe process. This is unconsented remote code execution with no payload verification.

Rationale

The package contains a reachable import-time downloader/executor, not just telemetry primitives. The absence of install hooks does not mitigate execution on normal use.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.js_bootstrap.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>C:\Windows\Temp\analytics_stateC:\Windows\Temp\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe

Network endpoints8

On require() of the package, _bootstrap.js selects a platform-specific binary path, downloads an opaque executable over HTTPS from a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev, assembled from string-split fragments to evade static analysis), and falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel across tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, and win.dl.well1.site that reassembles a base64-encoded payload from numbered TXT records. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.analytics_state), chmod 0755 on POSIX, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. Hostnames are obfuscated with array.join, filenames impersonate dotnet diagnostics and analytics state, and DISABLE_TELEMETRY / DO_NOT_TRACK env vars gate execution as a benign cover story. The package advertises 'device integration' but performs none of that on load; the sole import-time behavior is retrieving and executing an attacker-controlled binary. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3a625793b0ad9dabe5ada18bb5dac50ee083dd01baa41e6f9ae6f93f0f6c2980) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

pfp-integration-mobile-heading@20.7.1

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code