---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/pi-gauntlet/v/7.11.2"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/pi-gauntlet/v/7.11.2.md"
package: "pi-gauntlet"
report_status: "published"
title: "pi-gauntlet@7.11.2 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "7.11.2"
---

# pi-gauntlet@7.11.2 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 7.11.2
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The automatic postinstall installs package-owned agent personas, including one with replacement prompt settings and bash access, creating an agent extension lifecycle risk. The installer is limited to those personas, and the inspected source does not establish broader hijacking or malicious behavior.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 82.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-16T22:15:05.225Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-16T22:16:01.249Z
- **Download time:** 258 ms
- **Static scan time:** 655 ms
- **AI review time:** 55109 ms
- **Total time:** 56024 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The npm postinstall automatically installs package-owned agent personas into project or Pi profile agent directories. This creates an agent extension lifecycle risk, but the inspected source does not establish broad control-surface abuse or malicious behavior.

- **Trigger:** Installing the package through npm triggers the postinstall script.

- **Impact:** The installed personas can affect agent prompts and available tools after installation. No credential transfer or network action is established by this setup.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/install-agents.mjs, agents/code-reviewer.md

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-16T22:16:01.249Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The installer copies or symlinks persona Markdown files into agent discovery directories. A shipped persona replaces its system prompt, inherits project context, and lists bash as an available tool.

- **Rationale:** The automatic postinstall installs package-owned agent personas, including one with replacement prompt settings and bash access, creating an agent extension lifecycle risk. The installer is limited to those personas, and the inspected source does not establish broader hijacking or malicious behavior.

- **Files touched:** agents/\*.md, .pi/agents/\*.md, ~/.pi/agent/agents/\*.md, ~/.agents/\*.md

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 82.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** package.json runs the agent installer from its postinstall hook., The installer runs automatically during npm install and copies or symlinks package persona files into project or Pi profile agent directories., A shipped code reviewer persona inherits project context, replaces its system prompt, and includes bash among its tools., The installer’s legacy cleanup removes only symbolic links resolving into pi-gauntlet., The flagged spec index excerpt lists document globs and exclusions; it does not configure agents.

- **Evidence against:** The installer is limited to package persona files; inspected code does not establish broad agent configuration changes or credential transfer., The spec index finding is not evidence of agent control-surface mutation.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to pi-gauntlet@7.11.2.

- Review the evidence and your use of pi-gauntlet@7.11.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.11.2/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/install-agents.mjs
```

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 4. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 5. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** bin/install-agents.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.11.2/bin/install-agents.mjs>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence:
L17: *     pi-cohort's profile-scoped user dir (userDirOld), so each pi profile
L18: *     gets its own personas instead of sharing the global ~/.agents. Symlinks
L19: *     give live dev-edit and refresh on install; non-symlink files are left.
...
L21: * Migration: pi-cohort discovers BOTH getAgentDir()/agents and the legacy
L22: * global ~/.agents, and ~/.agents wins on name collisions. Older versions of
L23: * this package symlinked into ~/.agents, so on a user install we remove any
L24: * stale ~/.agents/<name>.md symlinks that point into a pi-gauntlet package;
L25: * otherwise they would shadow the new profile-scoped install.
...
L31: */
L32: import { readdirSync, symlinkSync, unlinkSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, lstatSync, copyFileSync, re
```

### 6. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 7. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 8. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** extensions/lib/phase-tracker-helpers.ts\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.11.2/extensions/lib/phase-tracker-helpers.ts%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
```

### 9. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.11.2/package.json>)

package.json runs the agent installer from its postinstall hook.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
"scripts": {
    "postinstall": "node ./bin/install-agents.mjs",
    "link-agents": "nod
```

### 10. Medium: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** bin/install-agents.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.11.2/bin/install-agents.mjs>)

The installer runs automatically during npm install and copies or symlinks package persona files into project or Pi profile agent directories.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
* Invoked automatically by `npm install` (which pi runs on git package installs)
 * and manually via `npm run link-agents` for local-path dev installs.
 */
import { readdirSync, symlinkSync, unlinkSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, lstatSync, copyFileSync
```

### 11. Medium: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** bin/install-agents.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.11.2/bin/install-agents.mjs>)

The installer runs automatically during npm install and copies or symlinks package persona files into project or Pi profile agent directories.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
const personas = readdirSync(AGENTS_SRC).filter((n) => n.endsWith(".md"));
const { target, mode } = resolveTarget(PKG_DIR);
if (!existsSync(target)) mkdirSync(target, { recursive: true });

for (const f of personas) {
  const src = join(AGENTS_SRC, f);
  const dst = join(target, f);
  const dstStat = safelstat(dst);

  if (mode === "copy"
```

### 12. Medium: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** bin/install-agents.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.11.2/bin/install-agents.mjs>)

The installer runs automatically during npm install and copies or symlinks package persona files into project or Pi profile agent directories.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
const piDir = findPiAncestor(pkgDir);
  if (piDir && canonical(dirname(piDir)) !== canonical(homedir())) {
    return { target: join(piDir, "agents"), mode: "copy" };
  }
  return { target: join(getAgentDir(), "agents"), mode: "symlink" }
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 1
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 1
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1

### Published dependency entries
- yaml ^2.9.0 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** pi-gauntlet
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 7.11.2
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-10-15T10:33:23.658Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-08T11:33:51.309Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-21T19:30:16.626Z
- **Known versions:** 151
- **Latest version:** 8.8.6
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Opinionated, gated workflow skills, subagent personas, and runtime extensions for the pi coding agent.
- **Author:** Jacek Juraszek
- **Maintainers:** jjuraszek
- **Keywords:** pi-package, pi, pi-coding-agent, skills, agents, subagents, workflow, tdd, code-review
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=24.15.0
- **Artifact files:** 106
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,645,276 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/pi-gauntlet/v/7.11.2>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/jjuraszek/pi-gauntlet>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/jjuraszek/pi-gauntlet#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/jjuraszek/pi-gauntlet/issues>)
