---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/pi-gauntlet/v/7.7.1"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/pi-gauntlet/v/7.7.1.md"
package: "pi-gauntlet"
report_status: "published"
title: "pi-gauntlet@7.7.1 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "7.7.1"
---

# pi-gauntlet@7.7.1 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse
- **Selected version:** 7.7.1
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The postinstall performs first-party agent persona setup, a guarded agent integration capability that warrants a warning under the review policy. The inspected source does not substantiate the scanner's broader control-hijack claim or a concrete malicious attack.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 89.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-11T21:20:19.887Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-11T21:20:45.142Z
- **Download time:** 1036 ms
- **Static scan time:** 669 ms
- **AI review time:** 23548 ms
- **Total time:** 25255 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Automatic installation places this package's persona files in pi agent discovery directories. This is an agent integration capability, but inspected code does not establish a broader control hijack or malicious behavior.

- **Trigger:** npm install runs the package postinstall hook.

- **Impact:** The personas become available for discovery by pi-cohort; legacy links pointing into pi-gauntlet may be removed.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/install-agents.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-11T21:20:45.142Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The installer copies personas into a project-level agent directory or symlinks them into the user-level agent directory, with an environment variable able to override the target.

- **Rationale:** The postinstall performs first-party agent persona setup, a guarded agent integration capability that warrants a warning under the review policy. The inspected source does not substantiate the scanner's broader control-hijack claim or a concrete malicious attack.

- **Files touched:** package.json, bin/install-agents.mjs

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 89.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** package.json runs the agent installer automatically during postinstall., The installer copies or links package-provided persona files into pi agent discovery directories., An environment override can select the target directory; otherwise the installer selects a project or user pi directory., Legacy migration removes only symlinks resolving into a pi-gauntlet package., The spec-index entry uses command-line arguments to query a repository corpus., The phase-tracker helper makes recovery decisions from phase status values.

- **Evidence against:** Inspected installer writes are limited to persona files and matching legacy package symlinks; no network operation or credential handling was found in these paths.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to pi-gauntlet@7.7.1.

- Review the evidence and your use of pi-gauntlet@7.7.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.7.1/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/install-agents.mjs
```

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 4. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 5. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** bin/install-agents.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.7.1/bin/install-agents.mjs>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence:
L17: *     pi-cohort's profile-scoped user dir (userDirOld), so each pi profile
L18: *     gets its own personas instead of sharing the global ~/.agents. Symlinks
L19: *     give live dev-edit and refresh on install; non-symlink files are left.
...
L21: * Migration: pi-cohort discovers BOTH getAgentDir()/agents and the legacy
L22: * global ~/.agents, and ~/.agents wins on name collisions. Older versions of
L23: * this package symlinked into ~/.agents, so on a user install we remove any
L24: * stale ~/.agents/<name>.md symlinks that point into a pi-gauntlet package;
L25: * otherwise they would shadow the new profile-scoped install.
...
L31: */
L32: import { readdirSync, symlinkSync, unlinkSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, lstatSync, copyFileSync, re
```

### 6. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 7. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 8. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** extensions/lib/phase-tracker-helpers.ts\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.7.1/extensions/lib/phase-tracker-helpers.ts%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
```

### 9. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 89.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.7.1/package.json>)

package.json runs the agent installer automatically during postinstall.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
"postinstall": "node ./bin/install-agents.mjs",
    "link-agents": "node ./bin/i
```

### 10. Medium: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 89.0%
- **Path:** bin/install-agents.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.7.1/bin/install-agents.mjs>)

The installer copies or links package-provided persona files into pi agent discovery directories.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
const personas = readdirSync(AGENTS_SRC).filter((n) => n.endsWith(".md"));
const { target, mode } = resolveTarget(PKG_DIR);
if (!existsSync(target)) mkdirSync(target, { recursive:
```

### 11. Medium: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 89.0%
- **Path:** bin/install-agents.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.7.1/bin/install-agents.mjs>)

An environment override can select the target directory; otherwise the installer selects a project or user pi directory.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
function resolveTarget(pkgDir) {
  if (process.env.PI_GAUNTLET_AGENT_DIR) {
    return { target: expandTilde(process.env.PI_GAUNTLET_AGENT_DIR), mode: "symlink" };
  }
  const piDi
```

### 12. Medium: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 89.0%
- **Path:** bin/install-agents.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/pi-gauntlet@7.7.1/bin/install-agents.mjs>)

Legacy migration removes only symlinks resolving into a pi-gauntlet package.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
function migrateLegacyGlobalLinks(names, newTarget) {
  const legacy = join(homedir(), ".agents");
  if (canonical(legacy) === canonical(newTarget)) return;
  for (const f of names) {
    co
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 1
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 1
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1

### Published dependency entries
- yaml ^2.9.0 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** pi-gauntlet
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 7.7.1
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-10-07T18:47:58.195Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-08T11:33:51.309Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-21T19:30:16.626Z
- **Known versions:** 151
- **Latest version:** 8.8.6
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Opinionated, gated workflow skills, subagent personas, and runtime extensions for the pi coding agent.
- **Author:** Jacek Juraszek
- **Maintainers:** jjuraszek
- **Keywords:** pi-package, pi, pi-coding-agent, skills, agents, subagents, workflow, tdd, code-review
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=24.15.0
- **Artifact files:** 105
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,589,260 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/pi-gauntlet/v/7.7.1>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/jjuraszek/pi-gauntlet>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/jjuraszek/pi-gauntlet#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/jjuraszek/pi-gauntlet/issues>)
