pincushion-mcp@1.11.19
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo install lifecycle or automatic attack chain was found, so the source does not support a malicious verdict. The explicit shell and upload capability remains a real risk if project configuration is untrusted, and incomplete static parse coverage makes a clean verdict unsuitable.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs pincushion-mcp mobile-wall publish with a deploy command or a wall configuration containing deployCommand.
Impact
A malicious project configuration can execute commands under the invoking user's account; selected screenshot content and the authentication header are sent to the configured service.
Mechanism
Explicit shell execution and cloud screenshot upload.
AI rationale
No install lifecycle or automatic attack chain was found, so the source does not support a malicious verdict. The explicit shell and upload capability remains a real risk if project configuration is untrusted, and incomplete static parse coverage makes a clean verdict unsuitable.
Evidence
mobile-wall.mjsserver.jslib/posthog.js
Network endpoints2
dpsqzszdviltqvethxbr.supabase.co/functions/v1us.i.posthog.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 78.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The mobile-wall publish command passes a deploy command from arguments or project configuration to a shell.
- The publish path reads a selected screenshot and sends it with a license key to the configured cloud endpoint.
- The server entrypoint exposes mobile-wall as a user-invoked CLI subcommand.
- Telemetry is configured to contact PostHog unless an opt-out environment variable is set.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or other lifecycle hook.
- The shell execution and screenshot upload are reachable only through the mobile-wall command and its publish flow.
- The reviewed license helper only labels key sources and produces local messages; it does not perform network I/O.
- No source evidence showed automatic credential harvesting, remote payload download, or hidden persistence.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedmobile-wall.mjsView file
17// injectable so both modes are testable without a simulator.
L18: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
L19: import {
High
mobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View file
121function publicUrlFrom(text) {
L122: const m = /(https?:\/\/[^\s"'<>]+)/.exec(String(text || ''));\n return m ? m[1].replace(/[),.;]+$/, '') : '';\n}\n\nasync function fetchCloudAnnotations(ctx, { baseUrl, key, proje...
L123: }
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
mobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L12117// injectable so both modes are testable without a simulator.
L18: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
L19: import {
...
L32: const DEFAULT_OUT = "crit-wall";
L33: const DEFAULT_FUNCTION_BASE = "https://dpsqzszdviltqvethxbr.supabase.co/functions/v1";
L34:
...
L78: function isSignedIn() {
L79: if (process.env.PINCUSHION_LICENSE_KEY) return true;
L80: try { return !!readFileSync(join(homedir(), ".pincushion", "license-key"), "utf8").trim(); } catch { return false; }
L81: }
...
L97: const firstLine = (e) => String(e.message || e).split("\n")[0];
L98: const execErrText = (e) => [e?.stderr, e?.stdout, e?.message].filter(Boolean).join("\n");
Findings
4 Critical7 High3 Medium6 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executionmobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationserver.js
CriticalDownload Executemobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityserver.js
HighChild Processmobile-wall.mjs
HighShell
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationmobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgelib/posthog.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationserver.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationmobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedlib/license.js#virtual:normalized:round1
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to pincushion-mcp@1.11.19.
See all versions of pincushion-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of pincushion-mcp@1.11.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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