registry / pincushion-mcp / 1.11.22
pincushion-mcp@1.11.22
Visual feedback as agent work packets. Stakeholders drop pins on your live app; your AI coding agent reads each pin (selector, screenshot, DOM, thread, acceptance criteria) via MCP and ships the fix.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install-time hook or confirmed covert payload. The package nevertheless combines MCP project access, shell execution of configuration-controlled commands, cloud synchronization, and telemetry, which is a meaningful dangerous capability.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Run the MCP executable with mobile-wall publish, or start the server with a license key or saved license file.
Impact
A malicious or unreviewed project configuration could run arbitrary shell commands; screenshots and product annotation data can leave the machine through the configured cloud workflow.
Mechanism
Shell execution of configured deployment commands plus authenticated cloud upload and sync.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no install-time hook or confirmed covert payload. The package nevertheless combines MCP project access, shell execution of configuration-controlled commands, cloud synchronization, and telemetry, which is a meaningful dangerous capability.
Evidence
mobile-wall.mjsserver.jslib/git.jscrit-wall/wallcrit-wall/wall.config.json.feedback/.license-key~/.pincushion/license-key
Network endpoints2
dpsqzszdviltqvethxbr.supabase.co/functions/v1/sync-annotationsus.i.posthog.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 78.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The package exposes a runtime MCP executable that dispatches the mobile-wall command.
- The mobile-wall publish action runs a command supplied through a flag or configuration using a shell.
- The publish action reads a selected screenshot, encodes it, and sends it with a license-key header.
- The server automatically selects its cloud sync endpoint when a local or environment license key is present.
- The Git helper can change and rebase branches in the selected project.
- Telemetry is configured to use a remote PostHog host.
Evidence against
- package.json contains no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare lifecycle hook.
- The shell command is reached only by the explicit mobile-wall publish workflow and derives from a user flag or project configuration.
- The observed cloud upload is specific to screenshots and annotation data for the stated product workflow.
- PostHog hashes the license-derived identifier before capture, and telemetry has opt-out environment flags.
- No source evidence showed remote code download and execution, secret harvesting beyond the product license key, or broad AI-agent configuration mutation.
Source & flagged code
11 flaggedmobile-wall.mjsView file
17// injectable so both modes are testable without a simulator.
L18: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
L19: import {
High
mobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View file
121function publicUrlFrom(text) {
L122: const m = /(https?:\/\/[^\s"'<>]+)/.exec(String(text || ''));\n return m ? m[1].replace(/[),.;]+$/, '') : '';\n}\n\nasync function fetchCloudAnnotations(ctx, { baseUrl, key, proje...
L123: }
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
mobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L12117// injectable so both modes are testable without a simulator.
L18: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
L19: import {
...
L32: const DEFAULT_OUT = "crit-wall";
L33: const DEFAULT_FUNCTION_BASE = "https://dpsqzszdviltqvethxbr.supabase.co/functions/v1";
L34:
...
L78: function isSignedIn() {
L79: if (process.env.PINCUSHION_LICENSE_KEY) return true;
L80: try { return !!readFileSync(join(homedir(), ".pincushion", "license-key"), "utf8").trim(); } catch { return false; }
L81: }
...
L97: const firstLine = (e) => String(e.message || e).split("\n")[0];
L98: const execErrText = (e) => [e?.stderr, e?.stdout, e?.message].filter(Boolean).join("\n");
Findings
5 Critical7 High3 Medium6 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executionmobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationserver.js
CriticalDownload Executemobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityserver.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltalib/git.js
HighChild Processmobile-wall.mjs
HighShell
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationmobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgelib/posthog.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationserver.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationmobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to pincushion-mcp@1.11.22.
See all versions of pincushion-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of pincushion-mcp@1.11.22 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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