pincushion-mcp@1.11.29
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AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource confirms consent-gated agent configuration and skill installation, which the review policy classifies as a warning. No unconsented install-hook mutation or concrete malicious execution chain was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The explicit setup subcommand activates the editor integration wizard.
- Setup asks permission before installing the runtime and connecting the selected editor.
- The configuration writer adds a Pincushion MCP entry to project-local editor configuration.
- After another approval prompt, installers create agent skill files using exclusive writes.
- Runtime dependency installation disables lifecycle scripts and uses the npm registry.
- package.json has no automatic npm installation lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- The inspected setup preserves conflicting assets and rejects unsafe paths.
- The mobile tool prints Maestro installation instructions; those strings do not establish automatic remote code execution.
Source & flagged code
12 flaggedA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
mobile-wall.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L121Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to pincushion-mcp@1.11.29.
See all versions of pincushion-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of pincushion-mcp@1.11.29 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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