--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/plogme/v/1.0.4" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/plogme/v/1.0.4.md" package: "plogme" report_status: "published" title: "plogme@1.0.4 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "1.0.4" --- # plogme@1.0.4 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — It mutates the user's WhatsApp newsletter subscriptions and discloses a stable machine-derived identifier to the operator. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Persistence - **Selected version:** 1.0.4 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. When a consumer opens a WhatsApp connection, the package automatically follows operator-selected newsletters and sends a machine-derived fingerprint to an operator-controlled endpoint. These actions are unrelated to the caller's requested connection. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 96.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-14T00:43:52.866Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-14T00:44:55.878Z - **Download time:** 504 ms - **Static scan time:** 2760 ms - **AI review time:** 59747 ms - **Total time:** 63012 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** When a consumer opens a WhatsApp connection, the package automatically follows operator-selected newsletters and sends a machine-derived fingerprint to an operator-controlled endpoint. These actions are unrelated to the caller's requested connection. - **Trigger:** Opening an authenticated WhatsApp socket created by the package. - **Impact:** It mutates the user's WhatsApp newsletter subscriptions and discloses a stable machine-derived identifier to the operator. - **Evidence paths:** lib/Socket/socket.js, lib/Utils/integrity.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-14T00:44:55.878Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Automatic newsletter subscription and remote host attestation. - **Attack narrative:** After authentication, the socket event handler starts a trusted-channel follow flow. Its callback issues a WhatsApp newsletter-join query, making a user account follow channels chosen by the package. The same connection event starts remote attestation. That code derives a hash from the hostname, platform, architecture, CPU model, and Node version and posts it with the package name and version to the operator endpoint. The channel-policy implementation is deliberately obfuscated, concealing the selected channel behavior. - **Rationale:** This package performs concealed, automatic actions on a user's external messaging account and phones home with a machine-derived fingerprint on normal use. The install hook is not the primary issue; the runtime connection path is. - **Files touched:** lib/Socket/socket.js, lib/Utils/integrity.js - **Network endpoints:** https://bailey.crysnovax.link/api/v1/verify ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** On every authenticated WhatsApp connection, the socket automatically invokes its trusted-channel follow routine., The connection handler sends a newsletter-join query and does not require a user request., Runtime attestation hashes host, platform, CPU model, and Node version, then posts that fingerprint to the operator endpoint., The package includes deliberately obfuscated channel-policy source. - **Evidence against:** The preinstall hook only checks the Node version and package identity; it does not download or execute a payload., No source evidence found of shell execution, secret-file harvesting, or a self-dependency lifecycle chain. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to plogme@1.0.4. - Avoid installing plogme@1.0.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js ``` ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: High Secret - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a high-severity secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 600 ``` ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: import { Boom } from '@hapi/boom'; L2: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; L3: import * as Crypto from 'crypto'; ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 6. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L111: pull: false, L112: devicePairingData: { L113: buildHash: appVersionBuf, ... L138: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content); L139: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]); L140: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) { ... L162: ]); L163: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg); L164: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey); ``` ### 7. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 8. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 9. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 10. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: import { Boom } from '@hapi/boom'; L2: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; L3: import * as Crypto from 'crypto'; ... L55: hasher.update(data); L56: if (!fileWriteStream.write(data)) { L57: await once(fileWriteStream, 'drain'); ... L88: if (typeof buffer === 'string') { L89: buffer = Buffer.from(buffer.replace('data:;base64,', ''), 'base64'); L90: } ... L115: let buffer = Buffer.alloc(0); L116: const stderrChunks = []; L117: ffmpeg.stdout.on('data', (chunk) => { ``` ### 11. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/channel-policy.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: const _0x5dbd5a=_0x4193;(function(_0x397f60,_0x361fcf){const _0x9cf7fd=_0x4193,_0x4bb7c2=_0x397f60();while(!![]){try{const _0x27969f=-parseInt(_0x9cf7fd(0x148))/0x1*(parseInt(_0x9c... ``` ### 12. High: Base64 Obscured Url - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/integrity.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L41: const nodeRequire = createRequire(import.meta.url); L42: const decode = b64 => Buffer.from(b64, 'base64').toString('utf8'); L43: ... L49: author: 'cGxvZ21l', L50: // https://web.crysnovax.link L51: site: '[redacted]=', ... L65: /** Developer escape hatch — set to '1' while actively editing the package. */ L66: export const isTrustMode = () => process.env.CRYSNOVAX_TRUST_MODE === '1'; L67: ... L93: try { L94: // lib/Utils/integrity.js → ../../package.json = package root manifest L95: manifest = nodeRequire('../../package.json'); ``` ### 13. High: Obfuscated - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 90.0% Package source appears deliberately obfuscated. ### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 15. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 16. Medium: Oversized Source File - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** WAProto/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = WAProto/index.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 14456902 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 17. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 18. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 19. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/business.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 4 ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/integrity.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = plogme@1.0.3 matchedPath = lib/Utils/integrity.js matchedIdentity = npm:cGxvZ21l:1.0.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = plogme@1.0.3 matchedPath = lib/WABinary/constants.js matchedIdentity = npm:cGxvZ21l:1.0.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 600 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall - **Dependencies:** 15 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 6 - **Development dependencies:** 1 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 21 ### Published dependency entries - @adiwajshing/keyed-db ^0.2.4 (Dependency) - @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency) - @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency) - async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency) - cache-manager ^7.2.8 (Dependency) - fflate ^0.8.2 (Dependency) - libsignal ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - long ^5.2.3 (Dependency) - lru-cache ^11.2.6 (Dependency) - music-metadata ^11.12.3 (Dependency) - p-queue ^9.1.0 (Dependency) - pino ^9.6.0 (Dependency) - protobufjs ^7.5.6 (Dependency) - whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.5 (Dependency) - ws ^8.19.0 (Dependency) - @napi-rs/image ~1.12.0 (PeerDependency) - audio-decode ^2.2.3 (PeerDependency) - better-sqlite3 ^11.0.0 (PeerDependency) - jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency) - link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency) - sharp \* (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** plogme - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.0.4 - **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE - **Version published:** 2026-09-14T00:42:50.726Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-09-07T09:32:36.573Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-30T13:26:55.361Z - **Known versions:** 15 - **Latest version:** 2.0.7 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Production-ready Baileys fork ⚉ with AI groups, Meta AI prompting, safe compositing fallbacks, rich responses, interactive messages, albums, newsletters, and communities — without antiban wrappers. - **Author:** plogme - **Keywords:** automation, baileys, baileys-fork, baileys-mod, crysnova ai, cody ai, bot-planning-replay, plogme, interactive-messages, js-whatsapp, meta-compositing, multi-device - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 155 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 17,242,015 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()