postboi@0.30.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s credential and child-process indicators map to disclosed, user-invoked CLI functionality, not an install-time malicious chain. Warn because the package has real credential-sync and agent-extension capabilities.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- CLI can upload provider credential values to the Postboi API.
- `env push` reads recognized project env credentials and sends them.
- CLI can create a first-party Claude skill after an interactive confirmation.
- No preinstall/install/postinstall hook; prepare only runs SvelteKit sync.
- Credential transfer is tied to explicit CLI setup or `env push`, with authenticated Postboi API requests.
- The agent-skill path is package-owned and installation is confirmed by the user.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postboi@0.30.0.
See all versions of postboi for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of postboi@0.30.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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