postboi@0.35.0
<div align="center"> <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/postboi-mail/postboi/refs/heads/main/static/logo.svg" alt="Postboi" width="250" />
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete malicious or unconsented package-install attack was found. The explicit setup path creates a persistent first-party agent extension and later lifecycle behavior, so warn rather than block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Explicit init can add a prepare hook that runs postboi sync on later installs.
- Sync refreshes an existing .claude skill without another confirmation.
- The env push command uploads selected provider credentials to the Postboi API.
- Package's own prepare hook only runs svelte-kit sync.
- CLI dispatch requires explicit init, skill, sync, or env commands.
- Initial agent-skill installation is confirmation-gated.
- No unconsented install-time credential upload or foreign agent-config mutation found.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postboi@0.35.0.
See all versions of postboi for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of postboi@0.35.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.