postboi@0.36.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged primitives implement explicit CLI setup and authenticated credential sharing, not install-time or covert collection. The prepare hook is a Svelte sync command and source shows no concrete malicious chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- CLI can upload supplied credential values to the authenticated Postboi API.
- CLI can install a bundled Claude skill under .claude/skills.
- package.json has only a prepare build-sync hook; no install/postinstall hook.
- Credential upload requires POSTBOI_TOKEN and explicit init/env command flow.
- Skill installation is an interactive confirmation or explicit skill command.
- No source evidence of covert collection, foreign-agent mutation at install, or unrelated exfiltration.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postboi@0.36.0.
See all versions of postboi for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of postboi@0.36.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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