postboi@0.37.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic source inspection found no covert harvesting, arbitrary command execution, remote payload loading, or install-time persistence. Scanner findings map to disclosed, user-invoked messaging setup and same-service credential synchronization.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has only a prepare hook running SvelteKit sync; no install/postinstall hook.
- CLI execution is gated by explicit subcommands such as init, env, sync, and skill.
- Credential upload targets the package's own Postboi service and requires an existing POSTBOI_TOKEN.
- Provider secrets are collected interactively during explicit CLI setup and written to selected project env files.
- The .claude skill write is an explicit CLI action or an init confirmation, not install-time mutation.
- Dynamic Cloudflare import is runtime-guarded for Cloudflare Workers bindings.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postboi@0.37.0.
See all versions of postboi for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of postboi@0.37.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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