postboi@0.37.1
<div align="center"> <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/postboi-mail/postboi/refs/heads/main/static/logo.svg" alt="Postboi" width="250" />
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner's credential and process findings map to documented CLI setup/synchronization behavior, not covert execution. The shipped lifecycle hook is non-networked `prepare`, and risky operations require explicit user commands and authentication.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The explicit `postboi env push` command can upload selected project provider credentials to the authenticated Postboi API.
- The CLI can write a bundled Postboi skill under `.claude/skills` during explicit setup.
- The only lifecycle hook is `prepare`, which runs `svelte-kit sync`; there is no install/postinstall hook.
- Credential upload is an explicit CLI action and requires `POSTBOI_TOKEN`; it is described as syncing to the user's Postboi account.
- Skill installation is prompted during setup, and the written skill is package-owned rather than a broad agent-control mutation.
- No browser credential harvesting, stealth execution, arbitrary remote payload loading, or unconsented exfiltration was found.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L108Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postboi@0.37.1.
See all versions of postboi for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of postboi@0.37.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.