postboi@0.41.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source establishes a user-triggered consumer lifecycle mutation with follow-on credential and agent-skill effects. It does not establish unconsented behavior at package installation, so a warning is more proportionate than a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The explicit init flow adds a consumer prepare lifecycle command that runs postboi sync on future installs.
- The sync command automatically refreshes an existing Claude skill file.
- The env push command collects configured provider credential variables from local project env files and sends them to the Postboi API.
- The package's own install hook is only a build preparation command, so the risky lifecycle is introduced by the user-invoked CLI rather than package installation.
- No preinstall, install, or postinstall script is declared.
- Credential transfer uses the package's configured Postboi service and requires an explicit CLI command or init flow.
- The Cloudflare dynamic import is guarded to the Cloudflare Workers runtime.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L47Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L47Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postboi@0.41.0.
See all versions of postboi for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of postboi@0.41.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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