postboi@0.42.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo automatic malicious install chain or hidden exfiltration was found. The package nevertheless provides an explicit, persistent agent extension that can drive non-interactive project and credential setup.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI creates a Postboi skill under the project's Claude agent-skill directory.
- The bundled skill instructs coding agents to run a non-interactive setup that writes secrets and provisions an account.
- The CLI routes this behavior through explicit postboi commands, but agent-mode setup can be non-interactive.
- The only lifecycle hook is prepare, which runs a Svelte synchronization command and does not invoke the CLI.
- The skill installation path is first-party and package-scoped, not a broad agent configuration write.
- Credential uploads require the explicit env push action and a Postboi token.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L47Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L47Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postboi@0.42.0.
See all versions of postboi for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of postboi@0.42.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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