postboi@0.43.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner findings arise from a mail-provider CLI that intentionally manages credentials and provider APIs. Source inspection found no install-time CLI execution, hidden collection, or unconsented outbound credential transfer.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user explicitly runs postboi env push, postboi init, or another named CLI command.
Impact
The user may intentionally upload configured provider credentials to their Postboi account.
Mechanism
User-invoked credential synchronization and project setup.
AI rationale
The scanner findings arise from a mail-provider CLI that intentionally manages credentials and provider APIs. Source inspection found no install-time CLI execution, hidden collection, or unconsented outbound credential transfer.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 93.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The package has a prepare lifecycle hook.
- The explicitly invoked env push command can read provider credential variables and send them to the configured Postboi API.
Evidence against
- The prepare hook only runs SvelteKit synchronization and falls back to an empty echo; it does not invoke the bundled CLI.
- The credential upload path requires the postboi env push command and a POSTBOI_TOKEN.
- CLI dispatch runs credential and project-write operations only for named user commands; there is no import-time or install-time exfiltration path.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
47// src/library/encoding.ts
L48: function base64_decode(value) {
L49: const binary = atob(value);
...
L131: const { pathToFileURL } = await import("node:url");
L132: let dir = process.cwd();
L133: for (;; ) {
...
L268: if (this.#hooks.before?.send) {
L269: return this.#hooks.before.send({
L270: provider: this.provider,
...
L317: async send_request(url, init) {
L318: return fetch(url, init);
L319: }
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L4747// src/library/encoding.ts
L48: function base64_decode(value) {
L49: const binary = atob(value);
...
L131: const { pathToFileURL } = await import("node:url");
L132: let dir = process.cwd();
L133: for (;; ) {
...
L268: if (this.#hooks.before?.send) {
L269: return this.#hooks.before.send({
L270: provider: this.provider,
...
L317: async send_request(url, init) {
L318: return fetch(url, init);
L319: }
Critical
Browser Credential Phishing
Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L47792} from "node:fs";
L793: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L794: import { join as join6, delimiter, dirname as dirname3 } from "node:path";
Findings
2 Critical3 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighShelldist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/workers_env.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postboi@0.43.0.
See all versions of postboi for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of postboi@0.43.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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