postman-cli@1.69.0
Official Postman CLI - Command-line companion for API development, testing, and automation
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook mutates detected global Claude Code and Codex instruction files without consent, matching the policy for install-time AI-agent control-surface hijacking. The behavior is limited to appending a package-specific instruction block, but its automatic lifecycle trigger makes the mutation an active attack surface.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- `package.json` runs the configuration script from `postinstall`.
- On global installs, the hook configures detected Claude Code and Codex global instruction directories without a consent check.
- The script appends Postman instructions to agent instruction files, changing their future control context.
- The change is limited to global agent instruction files and appends a Postman-specific block rather than replacing existing instructions.
- No network transfer or credential handling is shown in the inspected install hook.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg`package.json` runs the configuration script from `postinstall`.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L52Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to postman-cli@1.69.0.
See all versions of postman-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing postman-cli@1.69.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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