prettier-sdk@1.0.2

Package name `prettier-sdk` impersonates the top-tier `prettier` package (~50M weekly downloads), copying its README verbatim and forging metadata (`repository: prettier/prettier`, `homepage: https://prettier.io`, `author: James Long`). The `postinstall` script `node./plugins/preinstall.js` base64-decodes a hardcoded URL stored in a misleadingly-named variable `HASH_KEY = "aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iLzM2S0VN"` (decodes to `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/36KEM`, an anonymous mutable paste service), HTTP GETs it via axios, and pipes the response body's `cookie` field to the stdin of a detached `node` process via `spawn('node', [], { detached: true,... })` followed by `child.stdin.write(s1); child.unref()`. This executes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript on every installer's machine at `npm install` time, with no integrity check, from a host the attacker can mutate at will. Three independent block signals stack: typosquat-with-malicious-payload against a top-100 package, install-time fetch-and-execute from an anonymous paste host, and base64 obfuscation of the C2 URL.