---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/principles-disciple/v/2.6.5"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/principles-disciple/v/2.6.5.md"
package: "principles-disciple"
report_status: "published"
title: "principles-disciple@2.6.5 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "2.6.5"
---

# principles-disciple@2.6.5 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 17 findings warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 2.6.5
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The runtime setup example risks forwarding an Anthropic token to a Xiaomi endpoint, and the configured runtime sends the selected environment variable to its configured provider. Because this requires user configuration, the evidence supports a warning rather than a block.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-07T04:15:25.425Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-07T04:17:26.550Z
- **Download time:** 251 ms
- **Static scan time:** 12179 ms
- **AI review time:** 108694 ms
- **Total time:** 121125 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Setup guidance risks directing an Anthropic credential to Xiaomi’s API endpoint.

- **Trigger:** A user follows the example to configure a runtime profile, then the configured runtime makes a request.

- **Impact:** The Anthropic token may be disclosed to an unrelated provider endpoint.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/bundle.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-07T04:17:26.550Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The example sets apiKeyEnv to ANTHROPIC\_AUTH\_TOKEN and baseUrl to token-plan-cn.xiaomimimo.com; the runtime passes the configured environment value into its provider request.

- **Rationale:** The runtime setup example risks forwarding an Anthropic token to a Xiaomi endpoint, and the configured runtime sends the selected environment variable to its configured provider. Because this requires user configuration, the evidence supports a warning rather than a block.

- **Files touched:** .pd/config.yaml

- **Network endpoints:** token-plan-cn.xiaomimimo.com

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 86.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Critical Vulnerability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The setup error example pairs ANTHROPIC\_AUTH\_TOKEN with provider xiaomi-coding and the fixed endpoint token-plan-cn.xiaomimimo.com/v1., The configured runtime reads the environment variable named by apiKeyEnv, uses the configured provider, model and base URL, and passes that key into its request., The example is presented as configuration guidance; the reviewed manifest has no install lifecycle hooks.

- **Evidence against:** Sending the key requires a runtime profile to be configured; the manifest does not configure this example automatically., The package also has a package-owned telemetry endpoint, but its daily export checks for granted consent before sending.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to principles-disciple@2.6.5.

- Review the evidence and your use of principles-disciple@2.6.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** mcp/launcher.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/mcp/launcher.cjs>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L34: 
L35: const fs = require('fs');
L36: const os = require('os');
```

### 3. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 4. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 5. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L2: var Wbt=Object.create;var Tee=Object.defineProperty;var $bt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Hbt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var jbt=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gbt=Object.prototype.ha...
L3: `):[]}}return Zl=new WeakMap,ed=new WeakMap,t.NEWLINE_CHARS=new Set([`
```

### 6. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/bundle.js:
var Wbt=Object.create;var Tee=Object.defineProperty;var $bt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Hbt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var jbt=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gbt=Object.prototype.ha...
${p}`)}return a},he=aFt(w1e)});var GC,goe=C(()=>{Nt();cn();rn();gn();GC=class extends Be{retrieve(e,n={},r){let{betas:i,workspace_id:o}=n??{};return this._client.get(he`/v1/deploym...
`);return e[e.length-1]===""&&e.pop(),e}function VFt(t,e){return/^[\x20-\x7E]+$/.test(e)&&!/[\\^#]/.test(e)&&!(t==="unzip"&&e.startsWith("-"))}function zFt(t,e,n){let r=X1e(e),i=X1...
`,{flag:"wx",mode:384}),["-xf",e,"-C",n,"-X",i])}async function XFt(t,e){le
```

### 7. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L2: var Wbt=Object.create;var Tee=Object.defineProperty;var $bt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Hbt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var jbt=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gbt=Object.prototype.ha...
L3: `):[]}}return Zl=new WeakMap,ed=new WeakMap,t.NEWLINE_CHARS=new Set([`
...
L10: ${p}`)}return a},he=aFt(w1e)});var GC,goe=C(()=>{Nt();cn();rn();gn();GC=class extends Be{retrieve(e,n={},r){let{betas:i,workspace_id:o}=n??{};return this._client.get(he`/v1/deploym...
L11: `);return e[e.length-1]===""&&e.pop(),e}function VFt(t,e){return/^[\x20-\x7E]+$/.test(e)&&!/[\\^#]/.test(e)&&!(t==="unzip"&&e.startsWith("-"))}function zFt(t,e,n){let r=X1e(e),i=X1...
L12: `)+`
```

### 8. Critical: Reverse Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 92.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L2: var Wbt=Object.create;var Tee=Object.defineProperty;var $bt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Hbt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var jbt=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gbt=Object.prototype.ha...
L3: `):[]}}return Zl=new WeakMap,ed=new WeakMap,t.NEWLINE_CHARS=new Set([`
...
L10: ${p}`)}return a},he=aFt(w1e)});var GC,goe=C(()=>{Nt();cn();rn();gn();GC=class extends Be{retrieve(e,n={},r){let{betas:i,workspace_id:o}=n??{};return this._client.get(he`/v1/deploym...
L11: `);return e[e.length-1]===""&&e.pop(),e}function VFt(t,e){return/^[\x20-\x7E]+$/.test(e)&&!/[\\^#]/.test(e)&&!(t==="unzip"&&e.startsWith("-"))}function zFt(t,e,n){let r=X1e(e),i=X1...
L12: `)+`
...
L20: `)}async function k2e(t,e,n){let r=yB.create
```

### 9. High: Cloud Metadata Access
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L2: var Wbt=Object.create;var Tee=Object.defineProperty;var $bt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Hbt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var jbt=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gbt=Object.prototype.ha...
L3: `):[]}}return Zl=new WeakMap,ed=new WeakMap,t.NEWLINE_CHARS=new Set([`
...
L10: ${p}`)}return a},he=aFt(w1e)});var GC,goe=C(()=>{Nt();cn();rn();gn();GC=class extends Be{retrieve(e,n={},r){let{betas:i,workspace_id:o}=n??{};return this._client.get(he`/v1/deploym...
L11: `);return e[e.length-1]===""&&e.pop(),e}function VFt(t,e){return/^[\x20-\x7E]+$/.test(e)&&!/[\\^#]/.test(e)&&!(t==="unzip"&&e.startsWith("-"))}function zFt(t,e,n){let r=X1e(e),i=X1...
L12: `)+`
...
L20: `)}async function k2e(t,e,n){let r=yB.create
```

### 10. High: Remote Agent Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L2: var Wbt=Object.create;var Tee=Object.defineProperty;var $bt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Hbt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var jbt=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gbt=Object.prototype.ha...
L3: `):[]}}return Zl=new WeakMap,ed=new WeakMap,t.NEWLINE_CHARS=new Set([`
...
L150: \r
L151: `];for(;;){let{done:u,value:l}=yield Yi(i.read());if(u){if(a.trim().length>0)throw new Error("Incomplete JSON segment at the end");break}let p=o.decode(l,{stream:!0});try{let h=JSO...
L152: `:". ";let o=i;if(i.length>1e4){let a=i.substring(0,1e4),s=i.length-1e4;o=`${a}...and ${s} more chars`}e+=`Body: ${o}`,e=e.trim(),super(e,n),this.name="GoogleGenAiDefaultError"}};J...
...
L310: `):void 0}}function sMt(t){if(Array.isArra
```

### 11. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/bundle.js
L1: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L2: var Wbt=Object.create;var Tee=Object.defineProperty;var $bt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Hbt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var jbt=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gbt=Object.prototype.ha...
L3: `):[]}}return Zl=new WeakMap,ed=new WeakMap,t.NEWLINE_CHARS=new Set([`
...
L10: ${p}`)}return a},he=aFt(w1e)});var GC,goe=C(()=>{Nt();cn();rn();gn();GC=class extends Be{retrieve(e,n={},r){let{betas:i,workspace_id:o}=n??{};return this._client.get(he`/v1/deploym...
L11: `);return e[e.length-1]===""&&e.pop(),e}function VFt(t,e){return/^[\x20-\x7E]+$/.test(e)&&!/[\\^#]/.test(e)&&!(t==="unzip"&&e.startsWith("-"))}function zFt(t,e,n){let r=X1e(
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/bundle.js
L1: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L2: var Wbt=Object.create;var Tee=Object.defineProperty;var $bt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Hbt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var jbt=Object.getPrototypeOf,Gbt=Object.prototype.ha...
L3: `):[]}}return Zl=new WeakMap,ed=new WeakMap,t.NEWLINE_CHARS=new Set([`
...
L10: ${p}`)}return a},he=aFt(w1e)});var GC,goe=C(()=>{Nt();cn();rn();gn();GC=class extends Be{retrieve(e,n={},r){let{betas:i,workspace_id:o}=n??{};return this._client.get(he`/v1/deploym...
L11: `);return e[e.length-1]===""&&e.pop(),e}function VFt(t,e){return/^[\x20-\x7E]+$/.test(e)&&!/[\\^#]/.test(e)&&!(t==="unzip"&&e.startsWith("-"))}fu
```

### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 14. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 15. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = dist/bundle.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 4826107
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 17. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/bundle.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/principles-disciple@2.6.5/dist/bundle.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 1
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 5
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 1
- **Development dependencies:** 17
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 6

### Published dependency entries
- @sinclair/typebox ^0.34.52 (Dependency)
- better-sqlite3 ^13.0.3 (Dependency)
- commander ^12.0.0 (Dependency)
- js-yaml ^5.4.3 (Dependency)
- micromatch ^4.0.8 (Dependency)
- openclaw \>=2026.4.4 (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** principles-disciple
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 2.6.5
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-11-06T08:28:38.746Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-31T15:13:36.158Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T13:28:31.504Z
- **Known versions:** 141
- **Latest version:** 4.2.1
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Principles Disciple is an AI Agent Governance System. Stop correcting the same AI behavior across sessions. Turn repeated Agent corrections into Owner-approved, observable, reversible behavior principles.
- **Author:** csuzngjh
- **Maintainers:** principles-disciple
- **Artifact files:** 308
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 5,431,266 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/principles-disciple/v/2.6.5>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/csuzngjh/principles>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/csuzngjh/principles#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/csuzngjh/principles/issues>)
