psyclaw@0.27.6
A standalone, evidence-grounded social-science research agent — a conversation-driven agent that bundles the Pi runtime with psyclaw's research contracts, evidence gates, and workflows
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has notable user-invoked agent-runtime behavior, but source inspection found no install hook or concrete malicious chain. Its process controls limit worker tools and environment inheritance, and no exfiltration or payload staging was identified.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The user-run chat entrypoint rewrites a pinned Pi dependency for branding and loads its extensions.
- The extension discovers local Claude, Codex, and agent skill directories during a Pi resource-discovery event.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; its only lifecycle hook is prepublishOnly.
- Dependency rewriting occurs when the user launches chat, not during npm installation.
- Worker subprocesses restrict tools to a read-only allowlist and MCP subprocesses use an explicit environment without inherited secrets.
- No source evidence of secret exfiltration, remote payload loading, destructive behavior, or self-dependency was found.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/src/setup.jsView on unpkg · L172Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/src/integrations/mcp.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to psyclaw@0.27.6.
See all versions of psyclaw for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of psyclaw@0.27.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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